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ARTICLES
BRINGING STRUCTURE TO THE LAW
OF INJUNCTIONS AGAINST
EXPRESSION
ChristinaE. Wells'
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding

injunctions is in disarray. We know, or think we know, that the Court
heavily disfavors injunctions against expression. In several highprofile cases the Court has refused to enjoin speech even though it

might have resulted in significant harm.' Injunctions, the Court has

concluded, amount to prior restraints 2 and thus involve the "most se-3
rious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.",

t Associate Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. Many friends
and colleagues provided valuable comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this Article, including James Devine, William Fisch, Kent Gates, Tracey George, and Robert Pushaw. I am
especially indebted to Richard Fallon, Robert Post, and Geoffrey Stone whose comments on
various versions of this Article made me think harder than I ever thought I could. Mondi
Ghasedi, Tom Huffman, and Rikki Jones provided excellent research assistance. Finally, this
Article would not exist without the generous financial support provided by the University of
Missouri Law School Foundation through the John K. Hulston and Gary A. Tatlow Faculty
Research Fellowships.
1 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (holding that presumption
against imposing a prior restraint had not been overcome and reversing prohibition against
reporting on mass murder trial proceedings); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971) (vacating injunction against peaceful distribution of information describing
defendant's blockbusting real estate practices); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931) (vacating injunction under Minnesota statute that allowed injunctions against the publication of newspapers found to be malicious or scandalous).
2 Prior restraints are "administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v.
United States, 509 U.S. 544,550 (1993) (quoting MELVLLE NIMMER, NIMMER oN FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984)).
3 Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 559; see also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression... bear[s] a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity."); Matin Scordato, DistinctionWithout a Difference:A Reappraisalof
the Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 68 N.C. L REV. 1, 2 (1989) ("So strict is the scrutiny applied
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The association between court orders against expression and prior
restraints is so strong that, although the doctrine of prior restraint
originally referred to official licensing schemes, 4 "today [it] is understood by many people to mean chiefly a rule of special hostility to
injunctions. 5 Yet the Court's actual practice does not reveal an un

yielding hostility to injunctions. Rather it has upheld some injunctions pertaining to expression with seeming ease.6
Nevertheless, the Court's anti-injunction rhetoric endures, both
in its cases and in popular thought. The Court's dicta, for example,
refer to injunctions as "classic examples of prior restraints. 7 Scholars also often equate the two.8 Even authors of First Amendment
textbooks focus almost exclusively on the Court's prior restraint decisions, thus cementing the notion that injunctions are primarily important for their role in that doctrine. 9
This phenomenon is largely due to the Court's failure to attempt
a concrete explanation or synthesis of its injunction decisions. The

under the doctrine that the Supreme Court has never upheld a law that it has characterized as a
prior restraint on pure speech.").
4 See Thomas L Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint,20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
648, 650-52 (1955) (noting that the doctrine of prior restraint evolved from the historical licensing requirements and restrictions on printing in Europe and England).
5 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking PriorRestraint,92 YALE L.J. 409,426 (1983).
6 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding protective order
against newspaper prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that an
order prohibiting placement in sex-designated columns of advertisements for non-exempt job
opportunities did not infringe the newspaper's rights); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (upholding injunction prohibiting picketing near defendant's dairy and vendor's store).
7 Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550.
8 See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 960 (1998) (characterizing a recent case as a prior restraint decision because
it involved an injunction); Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson
from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 909 (1999) (describing Court's decision to uphold
an injunction as a finding that "such a prior restraint [was] necessary"); Stacy R. Horth-Neubert,
Note, In the Hot Box and on the Tube: Witnesses' Interests in Televised Trials, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 165, 190 (1997) ("The commonly recognized illustration of a 'prior restraint' is a court
injunction against the publication of information.").
9 See, e.g., ARNOLD H. LOEWY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 625-55, 691-721 (1999) (citing
prior restraint cases Near and the Pentagon Papers Case); STEVEN H. SHtFFRIN & JESSE H.
CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 335-40, 354-63, 415 (2d ed. 1996) (same); KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAw 252-56, 341-55 (1999) (same).
Only one textbook questions the relationship between injunctions and prior restraints in depth.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE Er AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 123-29 (1999). Even this textbook,
however, relegates discussion of non-prior restraint injunctions to the note materials while
prominently featuring the prior restraint cases. Compare id. at 127-29 with id at 88-98, 123-25.
This is not to say that these authors do not differentiate between injunctions or that they are
unaware of the non-prior restraint decisions. This survey of textbooks merely highlights the
manner in which teaching materials emphasize, perhaps unwittingly, the equation of injunctions
and prior restraints.
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Court's prior restraint cases have little content. 10 They neither set

forth nor analyze factors regarding when or why injunctions amount
to prior restraints, and they simply ignore contrary decisions involving injunctions. The decisions refusing to equate injunctions with
prior restraints suffer from similar failures-dismissing First
Amendment objections out-of-hand or with brief and unilluminating
statements that these injunctions are different. As each line of cases
evolved distinctly, the relatively high-profile prior restraint cases (as
compared to the mundane non-prior restraint decisions)" ultimately
resulted in the rhetorical equation of injunctions and prior restraints.
The abortion protestor cases of the 1990s presented the Court
with an opportunity to clarify its injunctions jurisprudence in yet another high-profile setting. 12 Unfortunately, the Court did not seize the

opportunity. In upholding portions of an injunction restricting expressive protest activity, the majority in Madsen v. Women's Health
Center, Inc. 13 reaffirmed the prior restraint doctrine's vitality while
simultaneously rejecting the equation of injunctions and prior restraints.'4 As in past decisions, Madsen never explained the basis of
its distinction between injunctions. To be sure, the Court placed great

emphasis on content discrimination principles,' 5 intimating that part
of the injunction in question was acceptable as a content-neutral time,

10See OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 69-74 (1978), for criticism of the
Court's equation of injunctions and prior restraints. See also Vincent Blasi, Towarda Theory of
PriorRestraint:The CentralLinkage, 66 MINN. L.REv. 11, 14 (1981) (arguing that close identification of injunctions with licensing systems is a matter of "rhetorical flourish" rather than
careful analysis); Jeffries, supra note 5, at 417 (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to
explain why injunctions should be presumptively unconstitutional as prior restraints); William
T. Mayton, Towarda Theory of FirstAmendment Process: InjunctionsAgainst Speech, Subsequent Punishment,and the Costs of the PriorRestraintDoctrine, 67 CoRNELL L REv. 245, 247
(1982) (arguing that only overbroad injunctions, rather than injunctions generally, should be
considered part of prior restraint doctrine).
1 Almost all of the significant scholarship regarding injunctions focuses on the prior
restraint decisions. See sources cited supranote 10.
12 See Christina E. Wells, Of Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The Consequences of Falling into the TheoreticalAbyss, 33 GA. L. REv. 1, 25-30 (1998) (discussing public attention toward protests).
'3 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
14 See i at 763 n.2 (noting that not all injunctions that may incidentally affect expression
are prior restraints).
15 Content discrimination principles distinguish between laws aimed at the content of the
speech ("content-based regulations") and those affecting speech but not aimed at its content
("content-neutral regulations"). These regulations are judged under different standards-strict
scrutiny for content-based regulations, and a lower standard for content-neutral regulations. See
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).--See generally Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's FirstAmendment
Jurisprudence,32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 159, 173-77 (1997); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulationand the FirstAmendment, 25 WM.& MARY L. REv. 189, 189-90 (1983), for discussions of content discrimination principles.
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place and manner regulation 6 while the7 remainder, being contentbased, was an illegitimate prior restraint.'
But Madsen did not establish whether content discrimination
principles supplant or work alongside the prior restraint doctrine. The
Court's failure to clarify this particular point has significant ramifications. The two doctrines are distinct, and Madsen's rhetoric leaves
8
lower courts with little guidance as to how to integrate them.' Subsequent Supreme Court actions suggest that the Justices themselves
disagree regarding their operation. 19 Yet in its most recent pronouncement on injunctions, the Court simply reiterated Madsen's
standard without elaboration.20

See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65.
See id. at 763 n.2 (distinguishing cases invalidating content-based injunctions as prior
restraints from Madsen, wherein the injunction was not based on the content of expression but
was issued in response to prior unlawful conduct).
18 Lower court decisions since Madsen reflect this confusion. See infra notes 153-55 and
accompanying text.
19 In opinions related to the denial of certiorari, for example, Justices Thomas and Scalia
interpret Madsen's impact on the prior restraint doctrine differently. Justice Thomas assumes
that the content-based/content-neutral distinction marks the difference between a prior restraint
and a non-prior restraint. See Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Aguilar, 120 S. Ct. 2029, 2032 n.2
(2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). It is unclear whether he thinks prior restraints should be judged by a higher standard than the strict scrutiny used with content-based
regulations. See id. Justice Scalia, conversely, argues that "all speech restricting injunctions are
prior restraints in the literal sense." Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1113 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the denial of cert.). Accordingly, content discrimination principles are not "conclusive of the validity of prior restraints," which must be judged by a higher standard. Id. at
1115.
20 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 372 (1997) (citing Madsen's test
for content-neutral injunctions).
The Court is not alone in its failure to attempt a synthesis of its injunction decisions.
Scholars discussing Madsen are largely indifferent to such a synthesis, instead focusing their
discussion almost solely on Madsen's standard. Some, for example, critique Madsen as simply
inconsistent with the prior restraint doctrine--usually relying on the circular reasoning that
injunctions are prior restraints. See, e.g., Matthew D. Stayer, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen
Test, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L REv. 465, 478 (1995) (noting that Madsen departed from precedent by finding that an injunction was not a prior restraint); Melissa Waller Baldwin, Note, An
Example of Policy CreatingLaw Through the FirstAmendment, 21 OHIO N.U. L REV. 1101,
1117-1119 (1995) (noting that Madsen creates an inconsistency regarding review of restrictions).
Other scholars accept Madsen's test without questioning it, instead focusing their discussion on its appropriateness, workability, or necessity. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ellis & Yolanda
S. Wu, Of Buffer Zones and Broken Bones: Balancing Access to Abortion and Anti-Abortion
Protestors' First Amendment Rights in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 62 BROOK. L. REv.
547, 583 (1996) (emphasizing the workability of injunctions to safeguard access to abortion
clinics); James Weinstein, FreeSpeech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of JudicialViewpoint
Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 471, 508-515 (1996) (advocating Madsen's refusal to
apply strict scrutiny to injunctions and noting that injunctions are a useful tool for protecting
property, privacy, and safety); Tam K. Kelly, Note, Silencing the Lambs: Restricting the First
Amendment Rights of Abortion Clinic Protestorsin Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 68 S.
CAL. L REv. 427, 456-58 (1995) (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist's recognition that injunctions
protect citizens' rights against First Amendment overstepping).
16
17
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It is time to bring structure to this area of the law. To that end,
an obvious solution is to discard prior restraint principles and do
clearly what Madsen unclearly alluded to-apply content discrimination principles to injunctions. Such application would provide a uniform framework for analyzing injunctions and is consistent with the
prominent position that content discrimination principles hold in the
Court's jurisprudence. 21 A close examination of their purpose, however, reveals that such principles are not appropriate with injunctions.
The content-based/content-neutral distinction is essentially a proxy by
which the Court ferrets out illegitimate government motives underlying speech regulations. The Court subjects content-based laws, which
are more likely to have illegitimate motives, to strict scrutiny; it examines less suspicious content-neutral regulations using less rigorous
intermediate scrutiny. This roundabout scrutiny of motives is useful
when dealing with far-reaching, inflexible legislative enactments, the
actual motives of which are difficult to determine. But content discrimination principles are not an adequate proxy for illegitimate motives with injunctive relief. A content-neutral injunction, for example, does not have the safeguards against illegitimate motive associated with a content-neutral statute. Conversely, a context-specific,
content-based injunction may not pose the same dangers of illegitimate motive as a content-based statute.
Because content discrimination principles are inadequate indicators of government motive, this Article proposes that the Court discard those principles in favor of a more direct purpose inquiry. Specifically, courts reviewing injunctions should initially identify their
objective justifications (i.e., the reasons for their issuance found in the
court order or evidentiary record). Once identified, courts can determine whether such justifications fall into one of three general categories of purpose-illegitimate, disfavored, and legitimate. Depending
upon the category into which an injunction falls, the reviewing court
can then scrutinize the injunction using more particularized tests specifically gauged to determine its validity. This approach guards
against potential illegitimate motives while avoiding the pitfalls associated with the broad and ill-fitting content-based/content-neutral labels. Moreover, when applied to past injunction decisions, this approach does remarkably well in explaining case outcomes.
Part I of this Article reviews the Court's cases regarding injunctions against speech, focusing first on the increasing elevation of
21 See Paul B. Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L
REV. 203, 204 (1982) ("Since its announcement, the constitutional principle limiting the power
of government to distinguish speech according to its content has played a significant role in the
Supreme Court's decisions.").
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rhetoric (as opposed to analysis) in the Court's prior restraint decisions. Part I also reviews the Court's other decisions involving injunctions and demonstrates that they too contain little, if any, analysis
concerning the appropriateness of injunctive relief against expression.
Part II examines Madsen's interaction with the Court's previous decisions and discusses how Madsen furthers the incoherence of the
Court's previous cases. Part I explains that content discrimination
principles, although superficially attractive, are inappropriate with
injunctive relief because the content-based/content-neutral distinction's function as a proxy for illegitimate motive does not hold with
injunctions as it does with statutes. Part IV suggests that a more direct search for illegitimate motives might be appropriate in the context of injunctions. It further explicates the manner in which courts
can accomplish this. Finally, Part V discusses whether certain miscellaneous issues particular to injunctive relief, such as the contempt
power, the collateral bar rule, and interim relief, still justify a rule of
special antipathy toward all or some injunctions.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INJUNCTIONS AGAINST EXPRESSION
A. Near v. Minnesota and Its Progeny: The Elevation of Prior
RestraintRhetoric
The term "prior restraint" originally referred to the licensing
schemes of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England that prohibited the publication of printed material without prior submission to
licensing boards run by the Crown.22 Under such schemes, the Crown
could deny a license to any publication deemed dangerous to its interests, thus preventing dissemination altogether.23 Licensing schemes
eventually fell out of favor,24 and English common law evolved to
protect against prior censorship, although it still allowed subsequent
punishment of expression.2 The drafters of the First Amendment
22 See LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 8-9 (1960); see generally FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776 (1952).

See LEVY, supranote 22, at 8.
See Emerson, supra note 4, at 651 (noting that licensing schemes fell out of favor because they proved unwieldy, not because of opposition to the general censorship principle).
2 Sir William Blackstone set forth the common understanding regarding licensing
schemes as the common law evolved:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequences of his own temerity.
2
24

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.
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clearly meant to adopt the English common law's protection against
prior censorship. 26 It is less clear whether they meant the First
Amendment to extend beyond protection against prior restraints.
Many early scholars argued that the First Amendment anticipated
such an extension, 27 while the Supreme Court initially pronounced
that it did not.28 The Court has since ruled that the First Amendment
applies to laws punishing speech after its occurrence, 29 but the distinction between subsequent punishment and prior restraint remains in
modem jurisprudence. Thus, there is a sense that the Court's current
hostility to laws punishing speech after the fact, while strong, nevertheless does not rise to the level of its special hostility toward prior
restraints. 303 Near v. Minnesota ex. rel Olsen,31 the Court's seminal
prior restraint
decision, reflects this bifurcation in the context of in32

junctions.

2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34, at 1039 (2d ed.
1988) (asserting that the First Amendment was "undoubtedly intended to prevent government's
imposition of any system of prior restraints similar to the English licensing system").
27 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNTED STATES 18-20 (1941) (arguing
that the Framers intended to guarantee the right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs, thus
eliminating seditious libel); THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSrrrUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 528-31
(Boston, Little, Brown 1883) (arguing that the United States never adopted the English common
law rule that made libel against the constitution or government indictable); HENRY SCHOFIELD,
Freedom of the Pressin the United States, in 2 ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY
75-85 (1921) (arguing that the Constitution did not adopt the English common law prohibiting
previous restraint but created a more expansive right); THEODORE SCHROEDER, "OBSCENE"
LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208 (1911) (arguing that the Constitution was designed to provide an unabridged, and unabridgeable, liberty of discussion, by dropping the English "bad tendency" test to determine the seditious character of a publication). See also DAVID
M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH INITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 193-200 (1997) (citing earlier scholars'
arguments that American constitutional protection of free speech limited the "bad tendency" test
of English common law).
2 See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (holding that First Amendment
prevents only prior restraints on publication, not subsequent punishment for publications
deemed contrary to the public welfare).
2 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (holding that the prohibition
of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to prior restraints).
30 See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 410 ('he doctrine imposes a special disability on official
attempts to suppress speech in advance of publication-a disability that is independent of the
scope of constitutional protection against punishment subsequent to publication."); Martin Redish, The Proper Role of the PriorRestraint Doctrine in FirstAmendment Theory, 70 VA. L.
REV. 53, 53 (1984) (arguing that the prior restraint doctrine "assumes that prior restraints are
more harmful to free speech interests than other forms of regulation"); Scordato, supranote 3, at
5 ("[P]rior restraints are to be strongly disfavored relative to subsequent sanctions for the purpose of determining the constitutional validity of such laws.").
3' 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
32 In addition to injunctions, the Court has applied its prior restraint analysis to other
regulations, including licensing schemes, see Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951),
taxes imposed upon certain newspapers, see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
250-51 (1936); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592-93 (1983), and a municipality's refusal to allow a play to be shown in its theaters, see
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 564 (1975). Because of the specific
nature of injunctive relief, however, this Article examines the Court's prior restraint doctrine

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5 1:1

Near involved a statute allowing the State of Minnesota to seek

injunctive relief against anyone regularly publishing "'malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory newspaper[s], magazine[s], or other periodical[s],"' on the theory that such materials constituted a public nuisance. 33 Violation of the injunction was unishable as contempt and
entailed a fine or potential jail sentence.
In Near, a local county
attorney invoked the statute against the publishers of a weekly newspaper that claimed "a Jewish gangster was in control of gambling,
bootlegging and racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing
officers and agencies were not energetically performing their duties. 35 The trial court, agreeing that the newspaper constituted a nuisance under the statute, perpetually enjoined the publishers from distributing "any publication...
containing malicious, scandalous and
36
defamatory matter.,
A bare majority of the Supreme Court struck down the statute.
Admitting that subsequent punishment of the expression via criminal
or civil laws might have been appropriate,37 the Court nevertheless
found that the statute's purpose was "not punishment, in the ordinary
sense, but suppression of the offending newspaper., 38 The operation
of the statute "put the publisher under an effective censorship" because it enjoined the offending publication and all similar, future
publications unless the publisher could convince a judge of the future
publications' good purpose. 39 Moreover, the statute did so based
upon a standard-malicious, scandalous, and defamatory-that was

only in that context. See generally TRIBE, supra note 26, at 1039-61, for a discussion of the
prior restraint doctrine.
33 Near,283 U.S. at 702 (quoting 1925 Minn.Laws 358). The statute provided a defense
of truth where the accused could prove that "the truth was published with good motives and
justifiable ends." Il
34 See id. at 703.
35 Id. at 704. As Professor Emerson noted, the Supreme Court described the articles in
question "with some understatement." Emerson, supranote 4, at 653. The articles were caustic
and virulently anti-Semitic. See Near, 283 U.S. at 724 n.1 (Butler, J., dissenting) (setting forth
the content of the articles). At least one scholar characterized the publication in question, the
Saturday Press, as "a vituperative scandal sheet if ever there was one." Blasi, supranote 10, at
15-16. Despite their tone, the articles contained kernels of truth, evidenced by the subsequent
grand jury probe into the police chiefs relationship with organized crime. See FRED W.
FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG 55-59 (1981). Moreover, at that time, scandal sheets, such as the
Saturday Press,were often the only publishers willing to criticize public officials. See id. at 31.
36 Near,283 U.S. at 705.
37 See id. at 715 ("For whatever wrong the appellant has committed or may commit, by
his publications, the State appropriately affords both public and private redress by its libel
laws.").
38 Id.at 711. The Court specifically noted that the statute did not "aim[] at the redress of
individual or private wrongs" but at "distribution of scandalous matter as detrimental to public
morals and to the general welfare." Id. at 708 (citations omitted).
'9 Id.at 712.
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not susceptible to precise definition. 40 Likening the statutory scheme
to English licensing systems, the majority struck it down as an unconstitutional prior restraint.4 1 Although Near did not hold all prior restraints to be unconstitutional, it emphasized that they were available
only in the most exceptional circumstances, 42 none of which were
present in Near.
Notably, nothing in Near suggests a general condemnation of
injunctions as prior restraints. Rather, the Near Court was concerned
with a statutory scheme allowing perpetual censorship of speech by a
single judge based upon a vaguely defined nuisance finding. The
majority was similarly concerned with the injunction's use to punish

criticism of the government. Even those portions of the opinion focusing on prior restraint are hopelessly entangled with language regarding seditious libel:
[T]he operation and effect of the statute in substance is that

public authorities may bring the.., publisher of a newspaper
..before a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of
publishing scandalous and defamatory matter-in particular
that the matter consists of charges against public officers of
official dereliction-andunless the.., publisher is able and
disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge[J.
. . his newspaper .. is suppressed and further publication is
made punishable as a contempt. This is of the essence of

censorship.4'

Because of this entanglement, it is never clear whether "the essence
of censorship" derives from the procedural aspects of the relief
granted, the nature of the speech punished, or, most likely, both.44
40 See id. at 712-13.
4' See id. at 713-23.
42

The majority listed the following exceptions: when a nation is at war, when words

"have all the effect of force," when obscenity is involved, and when publications invade "private rights." H, at 716.
43 Id. at 713 (emphasis added). See also Blasi, supra note 10, at 17 (describing the Near
injunction as "analogous to a prosecution for seditious libel"); Jeffries, supra note 5, at 416 ("In
truth, Near v. Minnesota involved nothing more or less than a repackaged version of the law of
seditious libel .... "). The Saturday Press's history surely raised concerns of government retaliation. Because of the publisher's past denunciation of public officials, the police chief ordered his men to prevent the first edition of the newspaper from getting to the news stands. This
episode prompted one scholar to observe "It]he ill-fated Saturday Press [was] the only paper on
record ever banned in the United States before a single issue had been published." FRIENDLY,
supra note 35, at 37.
4 Professor Blasi lists several issues contributing to the Near decision: (1) the content of
the speech enjoined; (2) the Minnesota nuisance law's allowance of perpetual censorship of
future expression; (3) the nuisance standard's vagueness; (4) the placement of key burdens of
proof on the publisher, and (5) the use of "public policy" as a justification rather than the need
to redress private wrongs. See Blasi, supra note 10, at 19. Given this complexity, he notes that
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Near's failure "to explain the functional basis of the prior restraint doctrine" 45 compounds this lack of clarity. The majority
opinion recounted the historical roots of the doctrine and its adoption
in the United States-its discussion is replete with cites to English
and colonial American documents.4 6 But it never explained why prior
restraints were more disfavored than other forms of regulation or even
what forms of regulation were prior restraints. 47 The Court's opaque
reasoning combined with its reliance on prior restraint rhetoric rather
than analysis laid the foundation for the current state of affairs. Later
courts, left to analyze the constitutionality of injunctive relief without
clearly identified standards, latched on to the most readily identifiable
aspect of Near-that the injunction was a prior restraint. Several
Burger Court decisions reveal this evolution away from Near's complexity and toward the equation of injunctions and prior restraints.
In Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe, 48 the petitioner, an
organization devoted to racial stabilization in a particular Chicago
suburb, distributed leaflets accusing the respondent real estate broker
of deliberately arousing racial fears in order to sell houses.4 9 The trial
court, believing that petitioner had invaded respondent's right to privacy, permanently enjoined petitioners "from passing out pamphlets,
leaflets or literature of any kind, and from picketing, anywhere in the
city of Westchester, Illinois., 50 The Supreme Court found the injunction unconstitutional, proclaiming that "[u]nder [Near], the injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication,
51
constitutes an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights."
Keefe did not involve a statutory scheme like that in Near, nor
was the issue of seditious libel present since all criticism was directed
"[t]o conclude that such a regulatory scheme, 'tested by its operation and effect,' amounts to a
prior restraint is by no means to establish the proposition that all injunctions against speech
deserve the same fateful characterization." Id. (footnote omitted).

45 THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE EXPRESSION 506 (1970); see also Paul L.

Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of HistoricalDevelopments, 66 MINN. L. REV. 95,
152 (1981) (noting that the Near Court's "argument concerning prior restraint was far more
historical than analytical").
46 See Near,283 U.S. at 713-15.
47 The Near dissenters were never convinced that the statutory scheme amounted to a
prior restraint. According to Justice Butler[the statute did] not authorize administrative control in advance such as was formerly exercised by... licensors and censors ....The restraint authorized is only in
respect of continuing to do what has been duly adjudged to constitute a nuisance....
There is nothing in the statute purporting to prohibit publications that have not been
adjudged to constitute a nuisance.
Id. at 735-36 (Butler, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
4" 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
49 See id. at 416-17.
50 Id. at 417.
51 Id. at418.
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at a private citizen. Nevertheless, the Court found the injunction unconstitutional because it "operate[d], not to redress alleged private
wrongs, but to suppress, on the basis of previous publications," distribution of any literature within the city.52 Moreover, the mere presence of injunctive relief apparently troubled the Court, which noted
that "the interest of an individual in being free from public criticism
of his business practices ...[does not] warrant[] use of the injunctive
power of a court.' '53 To be sure, the Keefe Court had reason to be
concerned. The complete suppression of the petitioner's viewpoint
and the perpetual nature of the injunction raised issues similar to the
statutory scheme in Near. But the Court's concentration on only
some of Near's concerns and its emphasis on injunctive relief as the
culprit subtly shifted the focus of the prior restraint issue.
Just a month after Keefe, the Court decided the Pentagon Papers
Case,54 which involved the constitutionality of an injunction barring
the New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers. 55 Even
more so than Keefe, the facts of the PentagonPapers Case did not fit
neatly within the Near framework:
What bothered the Court in Near was the effort to enjoin as
yet unwritten issues of the newspaper, in effect placing the
paper under the personal censorship of the judge. The Times
case, however, involved an effort to enjoin the publication of
existing, readily identifiable material and did not present the
special flaw that had triggered the response in Near.56
Moreover, a prohibition on publication of the Pentagon Papers arguably fell within one of the exceptions to Near's antipathy toward prior
restraints.57 Thus, one might expect that the Court's opinion striking
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 419 (emphasis added); see also id.
at 420 (noting that petitioner's conduct was
"not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful distribution of informational literature")
(emphasis added).
5
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
55 The Pentagon Papers contained a classified study of government decision-making before and during the Vietnam War. The New York Times and Washington Post decided to publish the study, which they obtained from Daniel Ellsberg, a former government employee. The
Court granted certiorari in large part due to the split
decisions of the Second and District of
Columbia Circuits regarding whether an injunction should issue. The former court barred publication by the New York Times but the latter court left the Washington Post free to publish the
information. See id. at 714 (per curiam).
5
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court Term, 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a
Nation Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 33 (1971) (footnote omitted).
57 The United States maintained that publication would jeopardize its effort in Vietnam as
well as national security generally, although it is unlikely that the government could have
proved its claim. See generally John Cary Sims, Triangulatingthe Boundaries of Pentagon
Papers,2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341 (1993). Nevertheless, given Near's war-time exception, the allegation deserved some discussion in the per curiam opinion.
52

53
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down the injunction would explain the relationship between the Pentagon Papers Case and Near. Instead, the Court issued a brief per

curiam opinion, simply stating:
We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United
States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study
entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet
Nam Policy."
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." The [district courts] held that the Government had
not met that burden. We agree.58
The opinion contained no discussion addressing the reason these particular injunctions amounted to prior restraints.5 9 It never even ex-

plicitly stated that an injunction was a prior restraint, leaving one with
6

the impression that this fact is so obvious as to go without saying. 0
The Court's assumptions, coupled with its failure to relate the particular instance to the Near framework, furthered the impression begun in Keefe that injunctive relief is the sine qua non of prior restraints. 61
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart6 2 completed the Burger Court's
equation of injunctions and prior restraints. 63 That Court held uncon58

New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam) (citations omitted).

-9 See Peter D. Junger, Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,23 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 3, 10-11 (1971) (describing the per curiam opinion as "unrevealing enough to
be relegated to a footnote"); see also Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 MINN. L REV.
171, 194 (1981) (describing the per curiam as "announc[ing] a result, not an analysis").
60 At least one scholar has credited the Pentagon Papers Case with raising to special
prominence the injunctions-as-prior-restraints equation. See Owen M. Fiss, The Unruly Characterof Politics,29 MCGEoRGE L. REV. 1, 7 (1997).
61 As in Keefe, the Court had legitimate fears regarding this injunction. The executive
branch essentially asked the lower court to issue an injunction based on its inherent powers,
possessing no statutory or other legal authorization, and in the name of "national security" interests, which the government asserted with little evidence. One can understand why the Court
might balk at issuing an order prohibiting speech based upon such amorphous criteria. See New
York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]n the cases before us we are asked
neither to construe specific regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are asked, instead, to
perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not the Judiciary."). No Justice
discussed these facts in the context of a finding that the injunction was a prior restraint. Most
simply presumed that the injunction was a prior restraint and started the analysis from there.
Moreover, some Justices explicitly equated all injunctions with prior restraints, further cementing their relationship in popular thought. See, e.g., id. at 731 n.1 (White, J., concurring) (discussing congressional authorization of the issuance of "prior restraints" by numerous government agencies).
62 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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stitutional a temporary gag order forbidding the press from printing
inculpatory information or "other facts 'strongly implicative"' of the
defendant in a highly publicized murder trial.64 Though recognizing
that the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial was at stake,65 Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, argued that pervasive pretrial
publicity did not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.6 6 Rather, the real
issue was whether the means employed to protect the criminal defendant's rights could survive First Amendment scrutiny. After briefly
reviewing Near, Keefe, and the Pentagon Papers Case, Chief Justice
Burger determined that "[tihe thread running through all these cases
is that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious
and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 67
Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the "marked differences" between
the gag order in Nebraska Press and the injunctions in the previous
cases.68 Nevertheless, he maintained that "as to the underlying is6 Nebraska Press was not the Court's last decision classifying an injunction as a prior
restraint, but it was the last decision directly to raise the issue. Other decisions, often cited as
prior restraint cases, involved somewhat tangential issues or were decided in emergency situations with little discussion. See CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994) (Blackmun, Circuit
Justice) (granting emergency stay of injunction prohibiting television network from displaying
illegally obtained footage of meatpacking plant); National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977) (reversing lower court's refusal to stay an injunction pending appeal because immediate
appellate review was unavailable to enjoined parties); Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (ruling that an ex parte order banning protest activities
unconstitutionally deprived speakers of notice and opportunity to participate in an adversarial
proceeding).
In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), the Court directly confronted the prior restraint issue raised by a Texas statute allowing injunctions against distribution of future obscene literature based upon a judicial finding that obscene speech was previously distributed. In this sense, the case raised one of the concerns central to Near and added
very little to the cases discussed in the text. Moreover, Vance took place in the context of an
obscenity trial-an area in which the Court has taken a particularly unique approach to prior
restraints.
64 Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 545 (quoting the state district court order as modified by
the Nebraska Supreme Court).
6 See i at 555 ("[Ihe measures a judge takes or fails to take to mitigate the effects of
pretrial publicity... may well determine whether the defendant receives a trial consistent with
the requirements of due process.").
See id at 554.
67 lIdat 559. The Court noted that "[tihe principles enunciated in Near were so universally accepted that the precise issue did not come before us again" until nearly 40 years later.
I at 557.
68 See id at 561. There were substantial differences between Nebraska Press and Near.
In the former case, there existed no complex statutory scheme imposing a "perpetual" censorship on all future publication. In fact, the Nebraska Press injunction was obviously temporary;
by its terms, it expired once the jury was empanelled. See i at 546. Moreover, one could
argue that a narrow order designed to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial fell within
Near's exception regarding protection of "private rights." See Linde, supra note 59, at 189
(describing tension between justifying gag orders as necessary for preservation of the right to a
fair trial and the undesirability of imposing ignorance on all for the sake of preserving it in a
few); see also Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN.L. REv. 539, 547-48
(1977) (explaining why a sufficiently narrow gag order is not a prior restraint).
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sue-the right of the press to be free from prior restraints on publication-those cases form the backdrop against which we must decide
this case. ' 69 Having found the gag order to be a prior restraint and
finding no facts to overcome the traditional antipathy toward them,
the Court held the injunction unconstitutional.70
Keefe, the Pentagon Papers Case, and Nebraska Press thus refleet a considerable shift away from Near's concern with perpetual
censorship and seditious libel. Although some aspects of Near were
present in those cases, they were not identical to Near, nor to each
other, and their sole unifying characteristic appeared to be the issuance of an injunction. In effect, the rhetoric of later prior restraint
cases began to focus on the form of the relief granted (i.e., that an
injunction was granted at all) rather than its effect (i.e., imposition of
a perpetual censorship via injunction).
B. The Court's Other Injunction Decisions
The Court's language in the above cases suggests an equation of
injunctions and prior restraints, but the Court's practice during this
same period included several cases in which it upheld injunctions
against expression. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies,Inc.,71 for example, the Court upheld an order barring peaceful union picketing outside of certain milk vendors' businesses. The
Court acknowledged that the First Amendment generally protected
picketing, which it described as "the workingman's means of communication." 72 The majority found, however, that these particular
pickets were "enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct." 73
Because "utterance[s] in [the] context of violence can lose [their] significance as ... appeal[s] to reason and become part of an instrument
of force," they enjoyed no First Amendment protection.74 The Court
emphasized, however, that picketing absent contemporaneous violence would not have been sufficient to justify an injunction; nor
69 Nebraska Press,427 U.S. at 561-62.
70

Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that gag orders could survive judicial scrutiny.

Such a finding required a determination regarding "(a) the nature and extent of pretrial news
coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained
pretrial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the
threatened danger." Id. at 562. While noting that the trial court's fears regarding pretrial publicity were likely justified, Chief Justice Burger argued that they were necessarily speculative.
See id. at 562-63. He also ruled that the lower court failed adequately to examine alternative
remedies and that the order's jurisdictional limitations rendered it ineffective to deal with the
potential dangers of publicity. See id. at 563-66.
7' 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
72 l. at 293.
73 Il at 292.
74

Id. at 293.
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would peaceful picketing that might cause violence by others. 75 In
support of its reasoning, Milk Wagon Drivers easily could have cited
to Near-thedistinction between peaceful attempts at communication
and speech that "has the effect of force" parallels one of Near's exceptions.76 The majority made no reference to Near, however, other
than a brief citation to support the proposition that potential violence
by others did not warrant an injunction. 7
The Court in PittsburghPress Co. v. PittsburghCommission on
Human Relations7 8 similarly upheld an order prohibiting a newspaper
from running job advertisements segregated by gender in violation of
an anti-discrimination ordinance. Unlike Milk Wagon Drivers, Pittsburgh Pressacknowledged the prior restraint issue. Nevertheless, the
Court refused to strike down the order, reasoning that it had "never
held that all injunctions are impermissible.,, 79 Rather, the majority
opined that "[t]he special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment." 80 Because the PittsburghPress order was "based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct," it did
not require "speculat[ion] as to the effect of the publication" as did
the injunction in the PentagonPapers Case.81 The order's clarity, its
narrowly drawn terms, and its issuance only after a final determination on the merits further added to its constitutionality.8 Finally, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart8 3 upheld a protective order prohibiting dissemination of information gained during the litigation process. The Seattle Times published several articles implying
that the respondent, leader of a religious group, was a crackpot and a
fraud. 84 As a result, the respondent filed a lawsuit alleging libel and
invasion of privacy. During the litigation, the Seattle Times sought
confidential information about the respondent through the discovery
process, admitting that it intended to use the information in subse75
76
77
78
79

See id. at 296.
See supra note 42.
See Milk Wagon Drivers,312 U.S. at 296.
413 U.S. 376 (1973).
Id. at 390.

s Id.
81 Id. at 390. Chief Justice Burger took issue with the majority's determination, noting
that "the Commission's order appears to be in effect an outstanding injunction against certain
publications--the essence of prior restraint." Il at 395 (Burger, C.1, dissenting). See also id.
at 400 (Stewart, L, dissenting) (arguing the Commission's order was unconstitutional because
no "government agency... can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it can-

not").
'2 See id. at 390.
'3 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
84 See id. at 23.
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quent articles.85 At the respondent's request, the trial court issued a
protective order prohibiting the Seattle Times from publishing and'
information about respondent gained through the discovery process.
The Supreme Court admitted that most of the information gained
during discovery would normally have been protected speech. 87 Arguing that the Seattle Times's access to the information was solely a
result of the discovery process, however, the Court rejected the notion
that the protective order "raise[d] the same specter of government
censorship that such control might suggest in other situations. 8 8 The
Court further dismissed the newspaper's prior restraint argument,
noting that the protective order left the Seattle Times free to publish
89
the same information if gained outside of the discovery process.
The opinion never discussed the prior restraint decisions. Its only
reference to them came in an ironic citation to Nebraska Pressfor the
proposition that a trial court could impose restrictions on communications by trial participants if necessary to ensure a fair trial.90
C. The Incoherence of the Court's Injunction Decisions
While Milk Wagon Drivers, PittsburghPress,and Rhinehart be-

lie an equation of injunctions and prior restraints, they do not clarify
the Court's doctrine regarding injunctions regulating expression. 91 If
anything, they exacerbate the problems reflected in the Court's prior
restraint decisions. Neither set of cases reflects any real analysis. In
See id. at 24.
The protective order prohibited the newspaper from disseminating any information
pertaining to respondent's financial affairs, the names and addresses of members of respondent's organization, or the names and addresses of contributors to respondent's organization that
was "gained through discovery, other than such use as is necessary in order for the discovering
party to prepare and try the case.... [l]nformation gained by a defendant through the discovery
process may not be published by any of the defendants or made available to any news media for
publication or dissemination.' Id. at 27 n.8.
87 See id. at 31 ("[l]nformation obtained through civil discovery authorized by modem
rules of civil procedure would rarely, if ever, fall within the classes of unprotected speech identified by decisions of this Court.").
8 Id. at 32.
89 See id. at 33-34.
90 SeeitLat32n.18.
91 In addition to Milk Wagon Drivers, Pittsburgh Press, and Rhinehart, which directly
addressed First Amendment issues, the Court has upheld some injunctions regulating expression
with little or no discussion of First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980) (upholding injunction prohibiting false and misleading statements during securities sales
campaign); National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (upholding
injunction preventing professional society from adopting a policy stating that competitive bidding was unethical); FrC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1964) (upholding a cease
and desist order prohibiting company from running deceptive advertisements). The Court's
reasoning in such cases appears to be that the expression enjoined is part and parcel of an illegal
business activity. Accordingly, it upholds such relief if it "represents a reasonable method of
eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct." ProfessionalEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 698.
8
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the prior restraint context, although Justices occasionally refer to
various tests with which to judge prior restraint injunctions, 92 they
never discuss why the injunctions in those cases were prior restraints.
As numerous scholars have noted, the Court's "analysis" rarely
amounts to anything more than catch phrases and buzz words.9 3 Too
often its antipathy toward an injunction was grounded in the empty
phrase that "'any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."' 94 As a result, "Near [has come] to stand for a sort of syllogism about injunctive relief: Prior restraint of speech is presumptively

unconstitutional .... An injunction is a prior restraint. Therefore, an
injunction against speech is presumptively unconstitutional. 95
The prior restraint cases' reliance on rhetoric would be less
problematic if the non-prior restraint decisions illuminated the void.
But those cases either ignored the prior restraint issue (Milk Wagon

Drivers) or dismissed it with a brief statement that the injunction at
issue did not raise the same censorship concerns as did a "classic"
prior restraint (Rhinehart and Pittsburgh Press). Discussion of the
relationship between prior restraint and non-prior restraint injunctions
is practically non-existent. Although the Court may have believed the
differences were obvious enough to make explanation unnecessary,
others evidently disagreed. Prior to Rhinehart, for example, some
scholars assumed that protective orders were analogous to prior restraints. 9 6 Commentators similarly
?7 questioned Pittsburgh Press's
98
dismissal of the prior restraint issue as did the dissenting Justices.

92 Chief Justice Burger in Nebraska Press, for example, subjected the gag order to a version of the Court's clear and present danger test. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 562 (1976). See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (judging injunction under a strict version of the clear and present
danger test); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (same).
93 See TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-34, at 1040 ("IT]he Court has often used the cry of
'prior restraint' not as an independent analytical framework but rather to signal conclusions that
it has reached on other grounds"); Blasi, supra note 10, at 14 ("[here has been too much
reliance in recent times on the rhetoric of prior restraint as a substitute for more discriminating
analysis."); Jeffries, supra note 5, at 417 ("[The Court has yet to explain (at least in terms that I
understand) what it is about an injunction that justifies this independent rule of constitutional
disfavor."); Mayton, supra note 10, at 247 ("[T]he easy ipse dixit has been to include [injunctions] among the repressions of speech that the English experience teaches us to abhor."); Scordato, supranote 3, at 10 (arguing that the doctrine of prior restraint is "little more than a label
attached to a legal conclusion already reached").
94 E.g., New York Tmes, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58,70 (1963)).
95 Jeffries, supra note 5, at 417. See also Scordato, supra note 3, at 10-11 ("[J]udicial
injunctions prospectively prohibiting speech . . . have been cited so frequently as illustrative
examples that they have become virtual paradigms of prior restraint.").
9
' See Arthur Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,and PublicAccess to the Courts,
105 HARV. L REV. 427, 437 (1991) (arguing that some commentators believed protective or-
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To be sure, the Court occasionally fashioned an explanation regarding its characterization of an injunction. In Nebraska Press,
Chief Justice Burger argued that prior restraints were worse than subsequent punishment of speech because
[a] criminal penalty or [civil] judgment ... is subject to the
whole panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of appellate review
have been exhausted. Only after judgment has become final,
correct or otherwise, does the law's sanction become fully
operative.
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an
immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a
threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 99
"chills"
speech, prior restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice never explained how injunctions have
a heightened chilling effect over subsequent punishment. Possibly, he
believed that persons subject to a court order are more likely to forego
speech out of respect for judicial authority than are those subject to
potential criminal penalties.' ° Or perhaps he had in mind the collateral bar rule, which prevents one who violates an injunction from
raising its unconstitutionality in later criminal contempt proceedings. 1 ' Regardless, numerous scholars have debunked Chief Justice
Burger's explanation, noting that subsequent punishments have an
equal, if not greater, tendency to chill expression. 10 2
ders should be subject to the more exacting constitutional scrutiny for imposing prior restraint,
rather than the mere "good cause" standard set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)).
97 See The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Leading Cases, 87 HARV. L REV. 153, 156-58
(1973) (arguing that the Court's analysis in Pittsburgh Press failed to adequately address the
First Amendment problems connected with orders directed at publishers rather than advertisers).
98- See supra note 81.
99 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
10o Several scholars acknowledge this possible interpretation of Nebraska Press. See Barnett, supranote 68, at 55; Jeffries, supra note 5, at 428-29; Scordato, supra note 3, at 11-12.
'0' See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding contempt convictions for violating an injunction prohibiting expressive activity without a permit even though
law upon which injunction was based was later found unconstitutional).
102 See Barnett, supra note 68, at 551-53; Blasi, supra note 10, at 35-43; Jeffries, supra
note 5, at 428-30; Junger, supra note 59, at 17; Mayton, supra note 10, at 275; Scordato, supra
note 3, at 14-16; Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
Chilling Effect, 58 B.U. L. REv. 685, 725-30 (1978). See also CHAFEE, supra note 27, at 10 ("A
death penalty for writing about socialism would be as effective a suppression as a censorship.").
Scholars acknowledge that the collateral bar rule may justify the Court's antipathy
toward injunctions against speech. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF
CoNSENT 61 (1975); Barnett, supranote 68, at 553; Blasi, supra note 10, at 20-21. But scholars
also question the rule's continuing vitality in the free speech arena. See e.g., Barnett, supra note
68, at 553-58; Blasi, supra note 10, at 21-22; Jeffries, supra note 5, at 431-32. Some scholars
simply deny that the rule has a heightened chilling effect. See FIss, supra note 10, at 72-73.
See infra Part V.A for more on the collateral bar rule.
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More importantly, Chief Justice Burger never adequately explained why the chilling effect supported condemnation of some injunctions but not others. PittsburghPress may have attempted such a
distinction. The majority noted that the injunction therein was based
on a "continuing course of conduct" that did not require speculation
as to the expression's effect. 10 3 But it is not obvious that an injunction aimed at conduct but incidentally affecting speech necessarily
inhibits expression less than an order aimed directly at suppressing
speech. An order controlling editorial decisions regarding advertising
format, for example, might affect advertising revenue and, ultimately,
a newspaper's circulation1 °4 Moreover, PittsburghPress did not satisfactorily explain why an injunction based on continuous conduct
poses no prior restraint problem. The Near injunction issued because
of the publisher's continuing publication of certain material.' 0 5 Such
publication amounted to a "course of conduct" likely to continue, yet
Near found the injunction to be a prior restraint. There is a distinction between the expressive conduct in Near and PittsburghPressthe former involved an act of publication amounting to a "nuisance,"
while the latter publication amounted to sex discrimination. One can
understand why the Court might view the vagueness of Near's nuisance standard with greater concern. Nevertheless, the Court never
explicitly established such parameters with its "course of conduct"
exception. 16
None of this is to say that the Court's intuitive assessments of the
injunctions before it were incorrect. But its reliance on rhetoric and
its habit of throwing out casual justifications without further explanation has had a substantial impact on the interpretation of its jurisprudence. Because there were no real principles upon which to rely, the
Court simply cited to whichever past precedents support its desired
outcome. In Nebraska Press, for example, the Court reviewed all
past prior restraint decisions but discussed neither Milk Wagon Drivers nor PittsburghPress'7--oversight of the latter being especially
significant given Pittsburgh Press'sreference to the "chilling effect"
so integral to Nebraska Press's reasoning. 10 8 Thus, the prior restraint
13

See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,390

(1973).
,04 See The Supreme Court,1972 Term, supranote 97, at 156-57.
.o5 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697,706-8 (1931).
'06 See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 395-96 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the
"continuous conduct" rationale did not satisfactorily distinguish the order from other prior restraints); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, supra note 97, at 158 (noting that PittsburghPress's
reasoning may not adequately distinguish it from expressive conduct in Near).
07 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
03 Milk Wagon Drivers also did not discuss its relationship to the Court's prior restraint
doctrine even though it post-dated Near by a decade. One can explain the Court's failure in this
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and non-prior restraint cases evolved along parallel, yet separate,
lines. In addition, the prior restraint decisions involved "sexy" issues-secret government documents, infamous criminal trials, retaliation against newspapers-generating much contemporary public
attention. 10 9 Scholarly attention has similarly focused on the prior
restraint cases, in stark contrast to writings regarding the other decisions.110 Such one-sided attention to cases utterly devoid of analysis
inevitably led to popularization of the injunctions/prior restraint

equation.
Several scholars may take issue with this Article's underlying
premise that the Court's distinction between prior restraint and nonprior restraint injunctions lacks internal substance. Some scholars
argue that the Court's decisions establish the principle that injunctions
amount to disfavored prior restraints only when they suppress communication "'before an adequate determination that it is unprotected
by the First Amendment."'1'
In reaching this conclusion, they point
to the Court's decisions upholding injunctions against distribution of
obscene materials as long as the material has already been judged to
be obscene,' 12 a principle they argue applies in all injunction cases. 113
Despite the attractive simplicity of this argument and its potential explanatory power, it is only partly persuasive.
regard: The Milk Wagon Drivers injunction bore little resemblance to the complex statutory
scheme in Near and the Court's jurisprudence had yet to evolve down its current path focusing
mainly on injunctive relief as the culprit; as a consequence, the Court did not see it as a potential
prior restraint issue. Nevertheless, that lack of discussion allowed later courts equating injunctions and prior restraints to overlook the decision even where it might seem relevant. For example, the ban on peaceful protest in Milk Wagon Drivers bears some resemblance to the Keefe
injunction banning picketing and leafleting that was found to be a prior restraint. The violence
involved in the former case may have been an essential difference, but that fact deserved some
discussion, especially since the Keefe Court emphasized that "peaceful distribution of informational literature" was a critical aspect of its decision. See Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 420 (1971).
109 New York Times, for example, generated almost daily national attention. See David
Rudenstine, The Pentagon Papers Case: Recovering Its Meaning Twenty Years Later, 12
CARDozo L. REv. 1869, 1870 (1991) ("The Pentagon Papers Case... was the subject of considerable commentary in the daily press and weekly news magazines during the litigation and
immediately afterwards."). Similarly, Nebraska Press involved a high profile criminal trial
which "immediately attracted widespread news coverage, by local, regional, and national newspapers, radio and television stations." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542
(1976).
110 In addition to a wealth of individual articles devoted to the prior restraint issue, see
supra note 10, entire symposia were devoted to individual prior restraint cases. See, e.g., Symposium, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers Case, 19 CARDOZO L
REV. 1283 (1998); Symposium, Near v. Minnesota, 50th Anniversary, 66 MINN. L REv. 1
(1981).
11 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147, 170 (1998) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) (emphasis added)).
112 See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
113 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 111, at 170.
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First, while the principle set forth above is integral to the Court's
obscenity jurisprudence, it is unclear that the Court meant it to apply
to all of its injunction decisions-certainly none of the classic prior
restraint decisions allude to it.11 4 Even Pittsburgh Press's use of
similar reasoning 1 5 never found its way into later prior restraint decisions involving injunctions outside of the obscenity context. 116 No
matter how obvious the principle seems to scholars, it cannot bring
coherence to the Court's jurisprudence if the Court refuses explicitly
to incorporate it.
Second, it is not clear that the principle should be extended beyond the limited context of obscenity.
The notion that an injunction is acceptable once speech has been "judicially determined to be
unprotected" implies a finding that the speech falls into a category 11of8
expression deemed to have no or only low First Amendment value.
But many of the Court's injunctions decisions did not involve lowvalue speech. Nebraska Press,for example, involved whether an injunction should issue against obviously high-value speech (information pertaining to a criminal trial) because of the potential danger
caused by that speech. Such an injunction requires a far more com1 9
plex weighing of factors than simply whether
the speech is "unproapproach recognizing that fact.
tected" and rightfully deserves an
Finally, even if the "judicially determined to be unprotected"
standard is used to mark the difference between prior restraint and
non-prior restraint injunctions, that standard still gives us no substantive guideposts with which to make the determination that speech is
"unprotected." It merely provides that once certain legal proceedings
have occurred, an injunction generally is not objectionable as a prior
restraint. The Court's failure to establish substantive standards with
which to judge the validity of injunctions is as much a fault of its ju114

See Kalven, supra note 56, at 33.

115 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
116 Notably, Madsen and Schenck, the Court's latest pronouncements on injunctions, did
not refer to this timing issue at all. See infra Part II for a discussion of Madsen's reasoning.
17 This principle could be extended to any speech that, like obscenity, is considered lowvalue. See infra Part IV.B.3.b.
"s The Court routinely distinguishes between speech that contributes to public discourse"high-value" speech-and speech which makes little or no contribution to such discourse"low-value" speech. See infra Part IV.B.3. The Court allows substantial regulation of the latter
but is far more protective of the former. See id.
19 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 n* (1971) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (arguing that obscenity cases were not relevant to decision whether to enjoin highvalue speech); Diane F. Orentlicher, Comment, Snepp v. United States: The CIA Secrecy
Agreement and the FirstAmendment, 81 COLuM. L REv. 662, 673-74 (1981) (arguing that
Kingsley's reasoning should be confined to the obscenity context where the issue of particular
expression's value "can usually be determined with as much certainty prior to communication as

afterwards").
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risprudence as is its failure to adequately explain the prior restraint
concept. Consequently, the above-referenced standard is only partly
useful in assessing the Court's injunctions jurisprudence.
The ensuing sections tackle the issue of the appropriate substantive standards in the context of injunctive relief. They first review the
Court's recent but unsuccessful attempt to provide such standards and
then propose more workable alternatives.
II. MADSEN V. WOMEN'S HEALTH CENTER, INC. -THE FUTURE OF
INJUNCTIONS PERTAINING TO EXPRESSION?

A. The Decision
In 1994, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.120 presented the
Court with an opportunity to remedy the effects of its past jurisprudence. Madsen arose from Operation Rescue's blockade of a Florida
clinic providing abortions. 121 The trial court originally issued an injunction barring Operation Rescue's members from engaging in violent and intrusive conduct outside of the clinic. 122 After concluding
that this injunction was insufficient "to protect the health, safety and
rights of women . . . seeking access to [medical and counseling]
services, '' 23 the trial court expanded it to include bans on certain expression, including prohibitions on demonstrating within certain distances of clinics or clinic employees' homes ("buffer zones"), using
noise amplification equipment or signs within earshot or eyesight of
patients during clinic hours, and physically approaching persons near
the clinic unless that person manifested consent to be approached
("no-approach zones").1 24
The Supreme Court granted the protestors' petition for certio-

rari after a series of split decisions regarding the injunction's con'20 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
121 Madsen was one of many

lawsuits resulting from a series of abortion clinic blockades

in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The blockades' purpose was to "clos[e] down abortion clinics
throughout the country to save unborn children." Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 666 n.2 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). See Wells, supra note 12, at 24-29, for a more
thorough history of abortion protests.
122 The Florida trial court enjoined Operation Rescue members from blocking access to the
clinic, physically abusing persons entering, leaving or otherwise connected with the clinic, or
inciting such actions by others. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 667 n.4.
123 Id. at 667 (alteration in original). Specifically, the court found that the protestors continued to block access to the clinic, jammed its telephone system, provided literature identifying
the staff of the clinic as "baby killers," followed doctors, pretending to shoot them from adjacent
vehicles, stalked clinic staff, and forced those seeking the services of the clinic to "run a gauntlet" of protestors shouting epithets and personal abuse. See id. at 667-69.
124 See id. at 669. The amended injunction's buffer zone provisions prohibited protests
within 36 feet of clinic property and 300 feet of employees' homes. See id.
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stitutionality.

25

The protestors' primary challenges to the injunc-

tion were that it was impermissibly content-based and a prior re-

straint.

26

The Madsen majority quickly dismissed the prior re-

straint argument--devoting only a single footnote to its refutation.
According to the majority,
[p]rior restraints do often take the form of injunctions ....

Not all injunctions that may incidentally affect expression,
however, are "prior restraints".... Here petitioners are not
prevented from expressing their message in any one of several different ways; they are simply prohibited from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. Moreover, the in-

junction was issued not because of the content of petitioners'

expression ...but because of their prior unlawful conduct.' 27

With the prior restraint argument summarily disposed of, the
majority devoted its attention to analyzing the injunction under content discrimination principles, which distinguish between contentneutral and content-based regulations. 28 While acknowledging that
the injunction affected only anti-abortion protestors, the Madsen majority rejected the petitioners' argument that it was necessarily content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny.' 29 Rather, it found that
the lower court issued the injunction as a result of "the group's past
actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties. ' 30
Satisfied that the lower court's purpose was not to suppress a particular message, the majority found the injunction to be contentneutral. 13' Recognizing, however, that content-neutral injunctions
125 The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the lower court's decision against the petitioner's

First Amendment challenge, finding the injunction content-neutral, necessary, and reasonably
tailored. See id.
at 671-75. While the case was pending in Florida's highest court, one of the
protestors sought an injunction in federal district court blocking enforcement of the trial court's
order. The federal district court refused to stay the state court's injunction, but the federal court
of appeals vacated the order, intimating that it violated the protestors' First Amendment rights.
See Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705,710-12 (1lth Cir. 1993).
126Brief for Petitioners at 8-20, 37-43, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753
(1994) (No. 93-880). The protestors also presented vagueness and freedom of association arguments, see id. at 30-37, 44-49, which the Court dismissed briefly at the end of its opinion.
See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 775-76.
127Id.at 763 n.2. (citations omitted).
128 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) (noting that contentbased regulations are subject to the most exacting scrutiny while content-neutral regulations are
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny).
129Strict scrutiny requires that a regulation be necessary to meet a compelling state interest. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting that content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972) (noting
that picketing regulations must be necessary to further significant governmental interests in
order to be valid).
130 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762.
"' See id. at 763.
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"carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than
do general ordinances,"' 132 the majority applied a new, and slightly
higher, standard of review than the
"intermediate scrutiny" typically
33
used for content-neutral statutes. 1
134
The injunction enjoyed mixed results under this new standard.
The majority upheld the buffer zone around the clinic because it was
necessary to protect clinic access and the privacy interests of unwilling listeners who were captive in the medical facility. 135 It struck
down the provision creating a buffer zone around the residences of
clinic staff, however, because the zone's sheer size-300 feet-precluded any notion that it was necessary to those interests. 36 The
Court also found the 300-foot no-approach zone to be unconstitutional. Although the provision aimed at preventing stalking and harassment, it swept within its purview "all uninvited approaches...
regardless of how peaceful."' 37 Such a prohibition violated the
Court's longstanding principle that "'in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate breathing
space to the freedoms protected by the
13
First Amendment.'t

Id. at 764.
133Intermediate scrutiny requires an inquiry into whether a regulation is "justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech ... [is] narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and... leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information." Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Madsen'sheightened intermediate scrutiny test required that content-neutral injunctions "burden
no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest." Madsen, 512 U.S. at
765.
134The Court had little trouble finding that the government interests in protecting access to
clinics, medical privacy, and patient's health and safety were "significant." It thus focused on
whether the injunctive provisions burdened "no more speech than necessary" to meet those
interests. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 767-68.
115 See id at 769-70 (citing Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding ordinance
banning focused picketing of residences based upon the strong interest in residential privacy)).
The majority also relied on the privacy interests of patients in upholding the injunctive provision
prohibiting high noise levels near the clinic. See id. at 772-73. The Court struck down the
"images observable" provision, however, noting that the images were less an invasion of privacy because the clinic could simply pull its curtains to keep them out. See iL at 773.
136 See id. at 775 (stating that limiting the time, duration, and number of picketers in a
smaller zone would adequately protect privacy interests).
'37 Id. at 774.
138 Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). The majority noted, however,
that had the speech within the no-approach zone been "independently proscribable (i.e., 'fighting words' or threats), or... so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of
physical harm," the injunction might have withstood scrutiny. I. at 774.
132
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B. Madsen's Place in the Supreme Court'sInjunctions Jurisprudence
1 39
As the most significant injunction decision in recent years,
Madsen presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify its injunctions jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the majority opinion instead continued the Court's tendency to categorize injunctions as "prior restraints" or "not prior restraints" with little elaboration or principled
reasoning. Madsen's references to the Pentagon Papers Case and
Vance v. UniversalAmusement Co. 140 for example, do not elucidate
principles distinguishing between prior restraint and acceptable injunctions. The PentagonPapers Case reference could not since the
brief per curiam opinion in that case was devoid of legal reasoning.
Similarly, Vance involved an injunction banning distribution of ob-

scenity, an area in which the Court's treatment of injunctions has
been unique. 141 It is not clear that Vance informs non-obscenity cases
such as Madsen or, for that matter, the Pentagon Papers Case. The
regulatory scheme in Vance strongly resembled the perpetual censorship scheme in Near,142 which might explain Madsen's reference.

But that still does not clarify when injunctions amount to prior restraints. The Madsen injunction may have looked nothing like those
in Near or Vance, but neither have a number of injunctions that the
Court has struck down as prior restraints. 43 Thus, Madsen's reference to the PentagonPapersCase and Vance as somehow "different"
looks suspiciously like previous injunction decisions declining to
elaborate on their reasoning.144

139Of the injunction decisions discussed above, the most recent one prior to Madsen was
decided in 1984. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (upholding protective
order which prohibited newspaper from publishing names of religious group donors obtained
during discovery).
'40 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
141See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text; supranote 63.
142 Compare Vance, 445 U.S. 308 (involving Texas statute allowing court to enter an order
perpetually enjoining distribution of future obscene literature based upon a judicial finding that
obscene literature was previously distributed) with Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S.
697 (1931) (involving Minnesota statute which allowed imposition of perpetual injunction of
future "malicious, scandalous or defamatory" material based upon judicial finding that such
material was published in the past).
143See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (involving injunction
prohibiting media from publishing or airing murder defendant's confessions and other incriminatory facts); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding vacation
of injunction prohibiting newspaper from publishing the Pentagon Papers).
'44 Justice Scalia argued that "an injunction against speech is the very prototype of the
greatest threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraine' and castigated the majority for
ignoring the numerous cases striking down such injunctions. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797-98 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Although
Justice Scalia ignored the non-prior restraint decisions, the majority's blithe dismissal of the
prior restraint issue lent credibility to his claim that the decision was a result of abortion politics.
See id. at 784-85.
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The Madsen majority did refer to two distinguishing factors regarding the legitimacy of injunctions: whether they regulate speech
based upon its content and whether they completely suppress speech.
But the precise relevance of those factors remains unclear. The obvious inference from the reference to content is that regulation of a particular expression because of what it says is a critical characteristic of
prior restraints. But that does not account for cases such as Rhinehart
and Pittsburgh Press, both of which involved content-based injunctions that the Court upheld. 145 The Court may be right that these
content-based injunctions pose fewer problems,' 46 but it needs to account for its cases more rigorously. Similarly, the relevance of the
Madsen injunction's limited nature is unclear. That an injunction
does not suppress information is important, as the Rhinehart court
noted. 147 Nevertheless, how does one distinguish between the Madsen limitation and an order temporarily restraining publication of
certain inculpatory evidence, such as that in NebraskaPress? Neither
entirely suppresses information, but the former survives while the
latter does not. Again, there may be ample reason to distinguish between the two, 48 but Madsen never adequately explains the distinction.
Finally, the relationship between Madsen's reliance on content
discrimination principles and the prior restraint doctrine is unclear.
The Court's reference to the content-based nature of prior restraint
injunctions suggests that content discrimination principles inform the
prior restraint doctrine. Traditionally, however, the Court has viewed
the two doctrines as quite distinct. The prior restraint doctrine is concerned with the form of regulation-i.e., an injunction or a licensing
scheme. It involves a "question of process, not substance." 149 Content discrimination principles, on the other hand, are substantive principles judging the constitutionality of speech regulations based upon
the nature of the speech regulated. A blithe statement that past injunctions amounting to prior restraints were content-based is not helpful to understanding which doctrine to apply or how to apply them in
tandem. Should courts presume injunctions are prior restraints if they
are content-based, or are only some content-based injunctions prior
145

See supranotes 78-90 and accompanying text.

See infra Part IV.B.3.a.
See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1984) (noting that protective
orders which prohibit dissemination before trial of information obtained during the discovery
process are not subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny because the party may disseminate
the protected information if it is gained independently of court processes).
148 See infra Part I.B.3.a.
149 Redish, supra note 30, at 89; see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 411 (stating that the
prior restraint doctrine is justified in terms of form, not substance).
'46
147
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restraints? If content-based injunctions amount to prior restraints, are
they, as the Court's prior restraint rhetoric suggests,' subject to an
even greater presumption against their constitutionality than that associated with strict scrutiny, or does the content-based/strict scrutiny
approach effectively satisfy the Court's concerns?15 ' Does Madsen's
focus on the content-based/content-neutral distinction 52 mean that
those principles supplant prior restraint doctrine, or does the latter
retain viability on some level? The answers to these questions are not
obvious, and Madsen's lack of clarity is reflected in lower court decisions. Some courts have applied prior restraint doctrine while ignoring content discrimination principles. 153 Others have applied the
content-based/content-neutral distinction with no mention of the prior
restraint doctrine.' 54 Still others attempt to synthesize the doctrines,
150See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (stating that prior restraints involve "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on Frst Amendment
rights").
151 Realistically, there may be little difference between the two standards. The Court refers
to content-based regulations as "presumptively invalid," a description similar to its rhetoric
regarding injunctions. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Inaddition,
strict scrutiny has been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L REv. 1,8 (1972). Nevertheless, the
Court's prior restraint rhetoric suggests an even greater antipathy, which some may point to in
support of more stringent treatment. Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that injunctions are
especially disfavored. Although he intimated in Madsen that application of the Court's content
discrimination principles was appropriate for injunctions, see Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), in a later opinion he indicated that such principles "deternine [only] the validity of subsequent restraints, and
to make them conclusive of the validity of prior restraints as well would destroy the doctrine
that prior restraints are specially disfavored." Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1115 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the denial of cert.) (citations omitted).
152 Madsen's discussion of the injunction's content neutrality spanned approximately six
pages of the majority opinion, see Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762-67, with an additional eight pages
devoted to application of heightened intermediate scrutiny, see id.at 767-75. In contrast, the
prior restraint argument ended up in a single footnote of fewer than ten textual sentences. See
id.
at 763 n.2.
1
See, e.g., San Antonio Community Hosp. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters,
dissenting from denial of petition to rehear
137 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J.,
en banc) (intimating injunction banning display of banner in labor dispute was prior restraint);
Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 526 U.S. 808
(1999) (characterizing an injunction barring use of videotape as a prior restraint); Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224-25 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying prior restraint
principles to injunction prohibiting publication of certain documents); Woodall v. Reno, 47 F.3d
656, 658 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing injunction against abortion protestors with reference to
prior restraint principles); Globe Int'l, Inc. v. National Enquirer, Inc., No. 98-10613, slip op. at
4-5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 1999) (characterizing request for preliminary injunction prohibiting
publication of certain information as a prior restraint).
'm See, e.g., St. David's Episcopal Church v. Westboro Baptist Church, Inc., 921 P.2d 821,
829-30 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Madsen to support application of content-discrimination
principles to injunction prohibiting focused picketing near church); Wheeling Park Comm'n v.
Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, 479 S.E.2d 876, 884-85 (W. Va. 1996) (citing Madsen
while applying content-discrimination principles to determine validity of injunction regulating
labor protest activity).
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explaining one in terms of the other. 155 Clearly, something more
needs to be done.
IlI. BRINGING COHERENCE TO INJUNCTIONS AGAINST
EXPRESSION-THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CONTENT DISCRIMINATION
PRINCIPLES

An obvious solution to the lack of structure in this area is to
clarify Madsen and hold that content discrimination principles govern
injunctions just as they do other aspects of the Court's jurisprudence.
There is much logic to this approach. First, it would finally put to rest
the Court's meaningless prior restraint rhetoric. Second, since their
inception, content discrimination principles have become increasingly
important in the Court's jurisprudence.' 56 They effectively supersede
previous standards such as the clear and present danger test 157 and
find application in fields as disparate as access to public fora 158 and

155 See, e.g., NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., 939 F. Supp.
1071, 1087
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (arguing that Madsen "highlighted the distinction between injunctions which
constitute merely literal prior restraints (in that they have incidental prospective effects on protected speech or conduct) and those which constitute unconstitutional prior restraints"); San
Diego Unified Port Dist. v. U.S. Citizens Patrol, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 368 & n.6 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (striking down injunction as failing to meet Madsen's intermediate scrutiny while noting
that "we need not decide whether [the injunction] constitute[s] a prior restraint or other contentbased restriction").
,-6 Several scholars agree that the Court's content discrimination analysis is one if its most
significant organizing principles. See Stephan, supra note 21, at 204 (emphasizing the significance of content discrimination analysis); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,54
U. CHi. L. REv. 46, 47 (1987) (stating that the content discrimination analysis "plays a central
role in contemporary first amendment jurisprudence"); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 616 (1991) (arguing that the Court has
not employed the analysis broadly enough).
157 The Court originally used several variations of the clear and present danger test to
determine the validity of speech restrictions. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
510 (1951) (using a test that weighs the magnitude of the "evil" against the probability of its
occurring); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) (stating that "the substantive evil
must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished"). Since the Court's announcement of its content discrimination principles, see Police
Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), the Court has used the clear and present danger test
only in limited circumstances, such as incitement of illegal activity. See Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (applying clear and present danger test to review law prohibiting
advocacy of criminal activity). See generally David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the
ClearandPresentDangerTest, 73 IND. LJ. 1217, 1219-34 (1998).
158 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (using content-based/content-neutral
distinction and related tests to determine validity of speech regulations in traditional public fora
such as streets, parks and sidewalks). The Court's content discrimination principles are less
relevant to public property that does not amount to public fora, such as libraries, government
employee mailboxes, and prisons. In such situations, the Court allows subordination of speech
to the government's managerial needs unless the government engages in viewpoint discrimination. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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regulation of low-value speech.15 9 Application to injunctions is thus a
natural extension of the Court's current approach.
Finally, although an imperfect explanation of the Court's past
injunctions cases, 160 content discrimination principles have some explanatory power. The prior restraint cases involved government suppression of speech based upon hostility toward its message or fear of
the expression's persuasive effect.16 Such purposes are generally
associated with content-based regulations. 162 Moreover, the strict
scrutiny applicable to content-based regulations is a stringent standard
which parallels, or very nearly so, the Court's disfavor of prior re-

straints. Thus, use of strict scrutiny with content-based injunctions
would generally provide the same result as in the prior restraint cases.
There is a similar relationship between content-neutral and non-prior

restraint injunctions. The non-prior restraint injunctions were issued
to avoid harms unrelated to the speaker's message, such as maintenance of the litigation process or prevention of protestor violence;
they also never suppressed speech. 63 Ergo, they resemble the Court's
requirements with respect to content-neutral regulations, which must
be justified by reasons unrelated to content and leave open ample altematives of communication. The Court's willingness to uphold the

non-prior restraint injunctions based upon a weighing of factors also
resembles the balancing involved in intermediate scrutiny, the standard associated with content-neutral regulations. 64 Use of content

discrimination principles thus provides, at least superficially, a rational framework for analyzing injunctions.
The Court should nonetheless refrain from using content discrimination principles when reviewing injunctions because applica-

tion in that context does not fulfill those principles' primary function.
159 The Court acknowledges that a few categories of speech are so low in value that they

generally are subject to standards other than content discrimination principles. See, e.g., Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (acknowledging obscenity as low-value speech); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (acknowledging fighting words as low-value speech).
Even here, however, the government cannot engage in gratuitous content-based distinctions in a
category of low-value speech. The Court will apply strict scntiny to such regulations. See
RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down regulation of racially hateful
fighting words because the statute only prohibited fighting words of a specific content).
16o See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
161 See supra Part LA.
162 See Wells, supra note 15, at 174-75 (discussing purposes often underlying contentbased regulations); see also infra notes 223-57 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Part LB.
164 Rhinehart, for example, espoused a balancing test similar to that used with contentneutral injunctions. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (asking whether
the protective order furthered "'an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression' and whether 'the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [was]
no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved') (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,413 (1974)).
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The Court's content discrimination jurisprudence is largely concerned
with guarding against potentially illegitimate government purposes
underlying regulations of speech, such as hostility toward the
speaker's message or fear that it will persuade citizens to act in an
undesirable manner. 65 Many scholars recognize that the contentbased/content-neutral distinction serves primarily as a method for ferreting out such purposes.166 Specifically, the Court strictly scrutinizes
content-based regulations because they are more likely to have an
illegitimate government motive.167 In contrast, its use of more lenient
intermediate scrutiny to review content-neutral regulations reflects
that they are less likely to have such motives. 168 Because injunctions
operate differently from legislation, however, content discrimination
principles do not provide an adequate proxy for illegitimate government motives in that context-as an examination of the Madsen injunction aptly demonstrates.
A. Is a Content-NeutralInjunctionReally Like a Content-Neutral
Statute?
Madsen classified the injunction regulating protestors as contentneutral because it was facially neutral (its terms did not restrict speech
of a particular content) and because it issued as a result of past pro-

165 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996) (plurality
opinion) ("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to
keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("'[Ihe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it."') (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)); City Council
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (noting that a desire "to suppress certain
ideas that the [government] finds distasteful" would be illegitimate).
166 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L
REV. 297, 329 (1997) (stating that the purpose behind the examination of content is to discover
the government's motive); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REv. 54, 96 (1997) (considering strict scrutiny as
a way to prevent inappropriate motives with respect to affirmative action); Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, Pledges, Parades,and Mandatory Payments, 52 RuTGERS L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1999)
(noting that the main issue is whether the government action was motivated by the content of
the regulated speech); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government
Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 413, 451-56 (1996) (comparing treatment by courts of content-neutral, viewpoint-based, and other content-based laws); Stone, supra
note 15, at 227 (noting that one of the reasons for examining content is to discover motive).
167 See, e.g., Wells, supra note 15, at 174-75 (examining a number of improper motives
and the courts' reactions to them).
'6 See Stone, supranote 15, at 230 ("[I]n the content-neutral context the risk of improper
motivation is quite low, for such restrictions necessarily apply to all ideas, viewpoints and items
of information .... "); Wells, supra note 15, at 175-76 ("[Much of the times, the government's
neutral justifications are legitimate efforts to balance expression with other important concerns,
such as order or privacy.").
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testor disruption rather than the protestors' message. 69 In this sense,
Madsen's determination of content-neutrality is unremarkable. When
determining whether a statute is content-neutral, the Court looks both
to the face of the statute and to its objective justifications, that is, the
objectively identifiable reasons for the law's enactment. 170 If both are
unrelated to 7the content of the expression, the statute is deemed content-neutral.' '
While the Madsen injunction technically satisfies this contentneutrality inquiry, the similarities between it and a content-neutral
statute end there. A content-neutral statute sweeps within its rubric a
limitless number of viewpoints. For example, a statute prohibiting
use of sound trucks within residential areas affects any person desiring to use such trucks to express themselves.1 72 In contrast, the Mad-

sen injunction, although not aimed at suppressing a particular viewpoint, clearly affected only a single viewpoint. This is necessarily so

given the nature of injunctions as a remedy. Injunctions issue in the
context of private disputes between parties; they resolve only that
dispute and apply only to the parties to the lawsuit.1 73 In a lawsuit

169 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1994) (setting forth
terms of the injunction).
170 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994); Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294-95 (1984). One can find these objective justifications in various places, including statements in the preamble of a statute, reasons put forth by
the government during a lawsuit challenging the regulation's constitutionality, and possibly,
legislative history such as official committee reports. In determining that the Cable Television
Consumer Protection Act of 1992 was content-neutral, Turner focused on the objective "findings" in Section 2 of the Act. See id. at 647.
This Article uses the term "objective justification" to refer to the objective "reasons that
can be adduced for [a law's] passage." Robert Post, Recuperating FirstAmendment Doctrine,
47 STAN. L REV. 1249, 1268 (1995). In contrast, it uses the term "motive" to refer to "the
actual psychological intentions" of legislators. Id. The Court has never been entirely clear as to
whether motive and justification are different things, frequently using the term "purpose" to
refer to both. See id. The justification/motive distinction, however, explains most of the
Court's practice, as discussed below. Moreover, because justifications and motives can conflict,
they are identified separately in this Article.
171 A neutral statute may be deemed content-based if its justifications relate to content. See
Turner, 512 U.S. at 645. For example, the Court would find a facially neutral law prohibiting
destruction of the United States flag to be content-based if its objective justification was to
suppress anti-American protestors' desecration of the flag. See United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990).
172 Such statutes may occasionally burden one viewpoint more than others. A statute prohibiting destruction of draft cards, for example, is more likely to affect anti-war protestors because burning one's draft card is often done as part of such a protest while few pro-war protestors would engage in such expression. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Nevertheless, by definition content-neutral laws cannot apply to only one viewpoint.
173 See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292
(1941) (noting that injunctive relief "aris[es] out of a particular controversy and [is] adjusted to
it"). Professor Fiss writes that an injunction has a unique
individuated quality ...aris[ing] from the fact, first, that it is addressedto some
clearly identified individual, not just the general citizenry; second, the act prohibited
or required is described with a degree of specificity not found in a liability rule or
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alleging various transgressions of anti-abortion protestors, the injunction aiming to solve the problem will affect only those protestors.
Content-neutral injunctive relief is thus missing the general applicability fundamental to content-neutral statutes.
This difference between injunctive and statutory relief is no
small matter. The broad applicability of content-neutral statutes is
critical to the Court's more lenient treatment of them, primarily because it assures the Court that an illegitimate motive (the actual subjective reason inspiring the legislature to act) does not underlie the
law. The Court has long eschewed direct inquiries into legislative
motive, arguing that they are "a hazardous matter."' 74 Its reticence
does not stem from a lack of concern regarding illegitimate motive.
As noted above, the Court's jurisprudence is rife with statements indicating disapproval of certain governmental purposes. 175 Rather, the
Court's reluctance reflects instrumental concerns that it is (1) too difficult to ascertain a single legislative motive, 176 and (2) insulting or,
possibly, an over-extension of judicial powers.17 7 The content-neutral
label in the statutory context allows the Court to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly-satisfy itself as to the absence of illegitimate legislative motive. A facially-neutral statute with objective justifications
unrelated to the speaker's message raises fewer worries regarding
illegitimate motive precisely because it potentially applies to so many
different viewpoints. That statutes result from political wrangling
between numerous political interests reinforces this point; presumably, opposing legislators will at least cry foul if they believe a content-neutral law is motivated by a desire to suppress a specific viewpoint.
A content-neutral injunction is neither generally applicable nor
the product of political wrangling. As the product of a single, oftenunelected member of the bench, such injunctions raise censorship
concerns beyond those normally associated with content-neutral stat-

criminal prohibition; and third, the beneficiariesof the decree are also more specifically delineated.
FisS, supra note 10, at 12.
"74 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at
383.
175 See supra note 165.
176 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384 ("What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a
statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork."); see also Kagan, supranote 166, at 438-39 (emphasizing differences in legislators' motivations); Post, supra note 170, at 1269 (explaining difficulty of assessing blameworthiness of governmental purposes).
17 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962) (arguing that
"judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system"); Fallon, supra note 166, at 95
(explaining that a determination that the government acted for a forbidden reason may be insulting).
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utes.178 Even if a judge's order is technically content-neutral, there
exists the possibility that the neutrality is pretextual. Of course,
judges are no more likely to act with an illicit motive than are legis17 9
lators. Many scholars would say that judges are less likely to do SO.
But the fact remains that judges are human and, unlike legislatures,
there are few checks on their censorial impulses.
In his defense, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Madsen
majority, recognized the increased risk of illicit judicial motive posed

by content-neutral injunctions.1 80 But his response to that risk-using
an elevated form of intermediate scrutiny' 1---does not adequately
protect against it. As applied to content-neutral regulations, intermediate scrutiny is a classic balancing test' 82 requiring a court to determine that a regulation is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "significant"
government interest while leaving open "ample alternatives of communication."' 83 Chief Justice Rehnquist's heightened intermediate
scrutiny, in contrast, requires that the injunction "burden no more
speech than necessary" to serve a "significant" state interest. 184 How,
"8 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 793 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[Injunctions] are the product of individual judges rather than of
legislatures.... The right to free speech should not lightly be placed within the control of a
single man or woman."); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1114 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the denial of cert.) (arguing that Madsen-like injunctions allow speech to "be quashed, or not
quashed, in the discretion of a single official").
179 Scholars have engaged in lively debate regarding the trustworthiness of judges to issue
injunctions. See, e.g., Blasi, supranote 10, at 52-53 (arguing that subsequent punishment is a
preferable scheme to injunctive relief because judges are risk averse in dealing with claims of
harms resulting from speech); Jeffries, supra note 5, at 426-27 (arguing that "the judiciary is
peculiarly well suited-in personnel, training, ideology, and institutional structure" to make
determinations regarding injunctions against expression); Mayton, supra note 10, at 250-51
(arguing that the "propensity for over-censorship is not so likely to be shared by... [t]he judiciary, [which) is accustomed to dealing with a range of societal interests").
Generally, those scholars who argue that the judiciary is more suited than others to
make sensitive decisions regarding the regulation of speech have the better of the argument.
Nevertheless, the lack of immediate checks on judicial action warrants a degree of concern that
one must take into account when crafting a standard of review. See Weinstein, supra note 20, at
473 (discussing need to guard against judicial viewpoint discrimination in cases involving
"hotly contested" issues).
18oSee Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764 ("Injunctions... carry greater risks of censorship... than
do general ordinances. 'Where is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally."') (quoting Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)).
'8' See id. at 764-65.
182 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, OfMarkets and Media: The FirstAmendment, The New Mass
Media, and the PoliticalComponents of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 169 (1995) (arguing that
intermediate scrutiny "seeks to balance governmental interests ... with burdens on free expression"); Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 61
(1992) (describing intermediate scrutiny as a balancing test located somewhere between strict
scrutiny and rationality review).
183Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984).
184 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765.
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exactly, does one tell the difference between these two formulas?
Both apply to "significant" interests, but the Court has never defined
what those interests are. In addition, the distinction between a regulation that "burdens no more speech than necessary" and a "narrowly
tailored" regulation is elusive at best. 185 Both tests reflect the Court's
tendency to devise formulas for balancing that purport to give guidance, even certainty, to judicial scrutiny, but which actually distance
us from concrete facts with which to do the balancing. 86 The odds
that courts will apply these rather antiseptic tests in an appreciably
different manner are slim.
In effect, Chief Justice Rehnquist's standard of review for injunctions leaves lower courts to balance in much the same way as
they do with content-neutral statutes. When judges review statutes,
that balancing is already much criticized:
[T he test is by its nature ad hoc ....
Because there is no
obvious way to compare such disparate values, this analysis
leads to an extremely subjective, and somewhat arbitrary and
unpredictable doctrine. Furthermore, the difficulty of the
analysis required by [intermediate scrutiny] has inevitably
pushed the Court to increase the deference the government
receives during judicial review .... 187

'8 See id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (terming the majority's
standard "intermediate-intermediate" scrutiny and commenting that the "difference between it
and intermediate scrutiny... is frankly too subtle for me to describe").
186 See Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 992-93 (1987) (noting that the Court's tiers of scrutiny "distanc[e] us from the discourse..
. The weighing mechanism remains a mystery, and the result is simply read off the machine.
Scientific balancing decisions are neither opinions nor arguments that can engage us; they are
demonstrations"); see also Laurent B. Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 748 (1963) (critiquing balancing tests and how they are
employed by judges); Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How: The Systemic
Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES INCONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219, 220-21
(Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC VALUES] ("Does the choice of words matter? It matters when the words become talismans that obscure rather than clarify the institutional process involved."); Robert F. Nagel, The FormulaicConstitution,84 MICH. L REV. 165,
196-97, 200-02 (1985) (arguing that the use of formal balancing tests is too mechanical).
187 Bhagwat, supra note 182, at 169-70 (footnote omitted). For other criticisms of intermediate scrutiny as allowing ad hoc judicial activism, see Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect
Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL
CONT. L.J. 953, 958-62 (1996); George C. Hlavac, Equal Protection Chapter,Interpretationof
the Equal Protection Clause:A ConstitutionalShell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1378
(1993); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L. REV. 135, 185 (1996);
but see Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: IntermediateScrutiny as JudicialMinimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298 (1998) (defending intermediate scrutiny as an indispensable
tool of the Court).
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Nevertheless, the risks associated with balancing may be acceptable
in the context of legislation.' 88 The built-in safeguards stemming
from the breadth and political nature of neutral legislation may provide some assurance of legitimate motivation even if courts apply
overly deferential or inconsistent review. But requiring a court to
balance slightly more carefully in the context of injunctions cannot
provide adequate protection against potential illegitimate motive. The
real problem with such injunctions is that their attributes make them
not content-neutral, at least not in the same sense as statutes. No form
of balancing can avoid that problem. 189 A different approach is required to adequately protect against illegitimate motives in the context of such injunctions.
B. Are All Injunctions Like Content-BasedStatutes?
If content-neutral injunctions cannot be considered contentneutral in the same sense as statutes, the obvious response under
content discrimination principles is to conclude that they are contentbased.' 90 In practical effect, treating all injunctions as content-based
makes them presumptively unconstitutional. Such an approach may
be consistent with the Court's rhetoric disfavoring injunctions as prior
restraints, but it ignores the Court's actual practice upholding some
content-based injunctions. More importantly, injunctions, even some
that are content-based, do not necessarily raise the same problems
with illegitimate motive as do content-based statutes, making a presumption of unconstitutionality neither necessary nor desirable. In
order to see how this is so, the operation of the "content-based" designation in the context of statutes must first be understood.

188 The efficacy of a balancing standard in the context of statutes is beyond the scope of
this Article and has already been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Symposium, When is a
Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy?: Reconciling Public Value and IndividualRights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 711 (1994). The argument here is simply that, to the
extent the Court uses a balancing standard with content-neutral statutes, it does so partly because the nature of legislative enactments in that context makes illegitimate motives less likely.
189 Additionally, the ad hoc nature of balancing may exacerbate fears that a court acts in a
result-oriented manner. In Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
for example, then-Justice Rehnquist described intermediate scrutiny as "so diaphanous and
elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices" in weighing the constitutionality of regulations. It is no small irony, then, that after so vehemently criticizing intermediate
scrutiny, he used a "heightened" form of it to judge the Madsen injunction. This willingness to
use an admittedly manipulable test may be what prompted Justice Scalia to accuse the majority
of reaching its decision for political rather than jurisprudential reasons. See Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
,90 Justice Scalia took this position in Madsen. See id at 792-93.
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Once the Court finds a statute to be facially content-based, it is
subject to strict scrutiny. 191 Ostensibly that test provides for some

balancing of interests-speech rights may suffer when regulation is
necessary to meet compelling interests. Unlike intermediate scrutiny,
however, no significant balancing occurs with this standard. Instead,
application of strict scrutiny almost always results in the regulation's
demise.192 Thus, the designation of a statute as content-based is the
single most important factor in determining whether it will be upheld.' 93
Why does the Court take such a hard line against content-based
laws? While some content-based statutes are enacted for illegitimate
reasons, the Court acknowledges that not all such statutes are motivated by a desire to suppress speech. 194 Many aim at unobjectionable
state interests such as a desire to compensate crime victims' 95 or a
desire to protect against labor-related violence. 196 Moreover, in defending their "compelling" need for the challenged law, the government must proffer objective justifications which, presumably, ought
to have some evidentiary support. If the existence of objective, noncontent related justifications assuages concerns regarding illegitimate
motive with content-neutral statutes, the existence of such justifications arguably should also assuage concerns with content-based statutes. Nevertheless, the Court does not consider such justifications,

191 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1993); see also Bhagwat,

supra note 182, at 162 (noting that facially content-based statute will be found content-based
and struck down).
192 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293, 296 (1992) ("If strict scrutiny is applied, the challenged law
is never supposed to survive").
Professor Bhagwat has argued that the Court increasingly uses strict scrutiny as a true
balancing test rather than as "fatal in fact." See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the
(D)evolution of ConstitutionalDoctrine, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 961, 964-65 (1998). A few cases in
the First Amendment context bear this out. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 736-53 (1996); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,211 (1992).
Moreover, some of the Justices, most prominently Justice Breyer, explicitly call for more nuanced balancing regarding content-based regulations. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govt.
PAC, -- U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Denver Area, 518 U.S. at
741. For the moment, however, the Court still largely views the content-based/strict scrutiny
formula as a nearly insurmountable barrier. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., - U.S. --, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (2000) (reiterating that "'[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid') (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
193 See Bhagwat, supra note 182, at 162 ("[E]ven the most seemingly innocuous regulation
... found content based.., will be struck down.").
194 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117 (1991) (striking down a content-based regulation even though illegitimate motive was
unlikely).
'9' See id. at 108.
196 See Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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instead 197striking down content-based laws almost as a matter of
course.

The Court's practice in this regard reflects its distrust of the objective justifications underlying such statutes. That is, with contentbased statutes it is more likely that the objective justifications are
pretextual. Some of this is due to the statute's regulation of content,
but that does not entirely explain the situation. Assume, for example,
that a city enacts a law limiting anti-abortion protests outside of all
hospitals based upon past disruptive and violent protests near one
hospital. Assume further that the city's justifications are clear and
that it has substantial proof of such problems in the past. Accordingly, while the statute is content-based, it is so because of a specific
relationship to a valid and reasonably credible state interest, the protection of medical facilities from violence and disruption. The mere
fact that the statue is content-based does not explain the Court's suspicion of illegitimate motive. The fact that the regulation is a contentbased legislative enactment, however, does explain the Court's suspicion.
Legislative enactments are broad rules of prohibition designed to
prevent future harms. 98 They operate at a relatively abstract level, as
with the abortion protestor statute, which bans all protests on the theory that disruption is more likely to occur with anti-abortion protestors than with other protestors. The speculative nature of the harm,
combined with the statute's regulation of specific content, raises suspicion regarding the possibility of ulterior motives despite the existence of a legitimate objective justification.199 The legislature's role
in responding to political constituencies further exacerbates this
problem. Statutes applying to a single, unpopular group almost always raise the specter of illegitimate motivation. 2 0 The breadth of a
statute's application also plays a role. It applies to all anti-abortion
197 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1993) ("[T]he mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose [will not] be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content").
'98

See In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1972) (declaring that the legislative func-

tion is to "adoptf] broad rules, perhaps having their greatest effect on parties not before it, based
on facts largely anticipated").
'99 In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the Court upheld a facially
content-based law with ostensibly legitimate justifications ("secondary effects" of speech).
Critics of the Court's willingness to uphold the regulation voiced the fear that the neutral justifications were merely pretexts for the city's distaste for the materials shown at such theaters. See
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 335 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining the dangers of
the Renton analysis); TPME, supranote 26, § 12-19 at 952 (critiquing Renton).
2m See, e.g., Wells, supra note 12, at 24-28 (discussing the possibility that legislative enactments restricting abortion protest activities resulted from political considerations regarding
their unpopularity); id. at 13-14 (discussing same with respect to members of the Communist

Party).
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protestors regardless of past participation in protests and protects all
hospitals regardless of their history as a target of such activity, increasing the possibility that the city seeks to chill disfavored expression rather than to avoid a specific harm caused by particular individuals. Thus, the very aspects of legislation that provided some assurances against illegitimate motive with content-neutral statutesgeneral application, breadth of coverage, and political wranglingactually raise suspicion regarding illegitimate motive when the statute
is content-based. The strong presumption
of unconstitutionality with
201
content-based statutes is the result. '
It does not necessarily follow, however, that an injunction regulating only abortion protestors poses the same problem of illegitimate
motive. Injunctions are not political in nature. They are individuated
remedies "arising out of a particular controversy and adjusted to it." 2
The party seeking relief, whether governmental or private, must allege a specific cause of action and particularized harm that rises to the
level of "irreparable injury." 20 3 Thus, a hospital seeking an injunction
must prove that its interests will be substantially impaired before it
can obtain an order barring anti-abortion protests near its premises.
Moreover, traditional remedial principles require that injunctions be
"ripe." They cannot issue without the "exist[ence of] some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility" of harm.2 4 In order to meet this requirement, the hospital
must show a substantial certainty of violent and disruptive protests on
its premises by the defendants. Such concrete evidence of a cognizable injury goes far to legitimate its motive in seeking the injunction.

20' See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of ProphylacticRules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 202
(1988) (noting that if there were a "foolproof fact-finding mechanism that enabled a court to
determine whether the government was influenced by hostility or favoritism toward certain
kinds of speech[,] [s]urely we would use that mechanism, at least in some cases, instead of
automatically invalidating a classification" based upon its content).
m0 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,292 (1941).
"o3 See, e.g., Doe v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 479 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1973); Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 850 (D.N.J. 1972). See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 8 (1991) (explaining that the primary purpose of the
irreparable injury requirement is to ensure that an injunction issues only if a plaintiff cannot be
adequately compensated by damages). While this standard is not overwhelmingly difficult to
meet, see id. at 4-5, it at least forces the plaintiff to put on proof of harm. In this way the legitimacy of the harm as a justification for regulating speech may be more reliable than the more
abstract harms at which statutes aim.
2' United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). See also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harang, 262 F. Supp. 39, 42
(E.D. La. 1966); Paraco, Inc. v. Owens, 333 P.2d 360; 363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). The ripeness
requirement stems from jurisdictional and equitable considerations.
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 249-51 (2d ed. 1994).

See generally DOUGLAS
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Likewise, injunctions apply only to parties before the court& 0 5 and aim
at remedying the conflict in the narrowest manner possible. 206 An
injunction preventing particular protestors from engaging in activity
before particular hospitals more likely aims at eradicating the stated
[which has] an overhanging and
harm than does an "abstract statute
' 20 7
undefined threat to free utterance.
This is not to say that a reviewing court can guarantee the trustworthiness of the stated reasons for an injunction. As discussed in the
next section, there are surely instances counseling skepticism of some
objective reasons. The context specificity associated with injunctions, however, carries with it some safeguards regarding potential
illegitimate motive that do not exist with content-based statutes. Consequently, the Court's fear that content-based statutes reflect illicit
purposes should not necessarily translate into a similar fear regarding
facially content-neutral injunctions which admittedly have contentbased overtones.
This is true even with some facially content-based injunctions.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,2 8 for example, involved a court order
prohibiting one party from publishing specific information regarding
the opposing party. Although content-based, the order originated because the Seattle Times acknowledged that it would use information
otherwise unavailable to it to further its publications regarding the
plaintiff.2°9 In effect, the newspaper used its role as defendant in a
lawsuit to abuse the litigation process for its own ends. The court's
order forbidding the newspaper from publishing private information
gained through discovery stemmed from a desire to protect the discovery process rather than to suppress speech. The context specificity
of the protective order-its narrow application to a specific dispute
between two parties, the acknowledged and concrete threat of publication by the Seattle Times, and the fact that the order prohibited only
publication of information gained through discovery rather than other
means-allayed concerns regarding illegitimate motive. Thus, this
0 See, e.g., FED. 1.CrV. P. 65(d) (limiting the application of injunctions to parties to the
lawsuit, their agents, or those who act in concert with them); see also Weinstein, supra note 20,
at 512 ("[Ilnjunctions must be addressed to particular individuals or groups.").
20 Although courts sitting in equity generally have great discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies, the Court's recent cases make clear that the scope of injunctive relief in constitutional cases must be carefully tailored to meet only the actual needs of the case. See Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (holding that findings of fact did not support system-wide injunction ordering changes in prison legal assistance program); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70
(1995) (holding that the district court exceeded its authority in mandating across-the-board
salary increases for Kansas City teachers).
20 Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 292.
m 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
2 See id&
at 24-25.
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content-based injunction did not pose the same danger of illicit motive as do content-based statutes.2' °
Under traditional content discrimination principles and the
nearly impenetrable barrier posed by strict scrutiny, however, this
injunction should have been struck down. Such an outcome seems to
defy common sense and, moreover, does not reflect what the Court
actually did in Rhinehart. A court constrained by these principles,
however, has little choice unless it manipulates the contentbased/strict scrutiny standard to reach a different outcome. This manipulation could occur in two ways. First, a court wishing to uphold
the injunction could acknowledge that the injunction is content-based

but find that it satisfies strict scrutiny. Such an application significantly departs from past practice; almost no content-based regulation
has been found sufficient under this standard.21' Given this history,
actual application of strict scrutiny as a balancing test could lead to
accusations of bias and politicking. Second, a court could find the
Rhinehart order content-neutral because its purpose was not to regulate content but to protect the discovery process. This, of course,
turns the Court's approach to content-based distinctions on its head
and, even more so than the first alternative, suggests an ulterior motive. In fact, the one case in which the Court obviously used such
reasoning has been almost uniformly criticized.21 2 Content discrimi210

To be sure, many content-based injunctions will raise concerns regarding dubious mo-

tives. For example, although the government sought the injunction in the Pentagon Papers
Case because it feared harm to national security, some Justices feared that it was actually trying
to avoid embarrassment or to keep its citizens ignorant of the true causes of the Vietnam War.
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 723-24 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Sims, supra note 57, at 412-415 (analyzing the government's arguments and the Supreme
Court's reaction to injunctive relief). Even here, though, the regulation of content was not the
sole basis for skepticism. Had the government proffered anything remotely resembling evidence of a concrete harm, its motives might have looked legitimate despite the injunction's
regulation of content. Thus, the government's request for a broad, suppressive injunction based
upon a speculative and remote harm looked suspiciously like a broad statutory prohibition. See,
e.g., Fiss, supra note 60, at 8; Doug Rendleman, IrreparabilityIrreparablyDamaged,90 MICH.
L REv. 1642, 1665 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RuLE (1991)).
211 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a content-based regula-

tion under strict scrutiny analysis while commenting that it was an extremely rare situation); see
also supra notes 192-97. Professor Weinstein has noted that courts forced to use strict scrutiny
with injunctions where such scrutiny seems unwarranted are likely to manipulate strict scrutiny
in ways inconsistent with our current understanding of that test. See Weinstein, supra note 20,
at 511-13.
212 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), in which the Court described a facially content-based law regulating adult theaters as content-neutral because it had
ostensibly legitimate, "secondary effects" justifications. This decision generated much scholarly and judicial criticism. See Wells, supra note 12, at 55 n.259, 56 n.260 (citing Renton's
critics); see also sources cited supra note 199.
Although still good law in the context of zoning regulations of sexually explicit movie
theaters, Renton has not gained acceptance in other areas of the Court's jurisprudence. See
Wells, supranote 12, at 56 n.263 (citing cases refusing to use Renton analysis); Keith Werhan,
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nation principles, then, are not helpful in assessing this particular injunction.
In sum, the content-based/content-neutral distinction serves as a
useful, even necessary, 213 proxy for the existence of improper government motive in the context of statutory relief. This proxy function,
however, is less relevant with injunctive relief. The presumption of
legitimate motive with content-neutral statutes does not hold with
content-neutral injunctions. Furthermore, applying a heightened form
of intermediate scrutiny provides insufficient protection against possible illegitimate motive. Similarly, the presumption that illegitimate
motive underlies content-based statutes is not altogether necessary
with injunctions. Application of the content-based/strict scrutiny
formula to facially content-based injunctions gives courts too little
flexibility and risks manipulation of that formula to reach a desired
outcome. In the injunctive context, the content-based/content-neutral
designation loses its meaning and becomes a jurisprudence of words
rather than of things.214
IV. INJUNCTIONS REGULATING EXPRESSION-THE ARGUMENT FOR
A MORE DIRECT INQUIRY INTO GOVERNMENTAL MOTIVES

Rather than rely on content discrimination principles as a proxy
for motive scrutiny, this section argues that, because of the contextual
nature of injunctive relief, the Court can and should inquire more directly into governmental purposes regarding injunctions. Two issues
arise with respect to such purpose scrutiny. First, can we avoid the
institutional problems identified by the Court with respect to motive
inquiries simply because injunctions are involved? Second, what is
the relevant universe of governmental purposes and how should we
treat them?

The Liberalizationof Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IoWA L. Ray. 51, 73-76
(1994) (recounting Court's effort to "reduce the scope of the 'secondary effects' doctrine of
Renton").
213 Not everyone agrees that content discrimination principles are a useful proxy for illegitimate government motive with statutes. Some scholars argue for discarding such principles
in favor of a direct inquiry into government purposes in all situations. See TRIBE, supra note 26,
§ 12-6 at 823-825; Bhagwhat, supra note 166, at 321-23. While provocative and illuminating,
lengthy discussion of this proposition is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to note
that, because of the nature of legislative remedies, content discrimination principles serve as
betterproxies for illegitimate motives with statutes than with injunctions.
21 See OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., Law in Science-Science in Lnv,in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 210, 238 (1920) (counseling lawyers to "think things not words").
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A. Institutional Concerns with Motive Inquiries in the Context of
Injunctions
The Court avoids motive inquiries in reviewing statutes because
of difficulties in attributing a single motive to a large •legislative•body
215
and because such inquiries may amount to judicial overreaching.
Can a reviewing court 216 inquire directly into judicial motive without
encountering these problems? To the extent that a single judge issues
an injunction, the possibility of multiple, conflicting motives lessens. 217 If motive, however, is the "actual subjective reason" inspiring
action, the inclusion of a judge rather than a legislature changes
nothing. Judges, like legislatures, can hide their motives, making attempts to ferret them out directly almost impossible.218 In addition,
while appellate court scrutiny of an inferior court's subjective motive
may not involve separation of powers issues, it is no less insulting to
the lower court. Judges are as reluctant to accuse their own colleagues of bad faith as they are legislatures. This may be especially
true with injunctive relief, an area in which reviewing. courts typically
defer to trial courts' equitable discretion.21 9 Thus, the Court's institutional concerns regarding direct inquiries into legislative motive may

also argue against direct inquiry into judicial motives.
One can, however, use a far more direct proxy for scrutiny of judicial motive than the content-based/content-neutral distinction. Specifically, a reviewing court can ferret out judicial motive using an injunction's objective justification as the starting point. As the product
of a lawsuit alleging specific harms, an injunction should issue for
readily identifiable reasons. In fact, most jurisdictions' rules of civil
procedure require that courts set forth the reasons for the injunction in
215
216

See supranotes 174, 176-77 and accompanying text.
This section is structured in terms of how reviewing courts should assess the constitu-

tionality of an injunction, but the same justifications and related tests could also guide an issuing
court.

217 A judge's motives, of course, might conflict with the party seeking the injunction. The
true source of illegitimate motive, for example, might arise from the party while the judge has
no feeling one way or another. Because a court order may give effect to a party's motive, even
if unwittingly, this Article treats the term "judicial motive" as encompassing both.
215 See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496 (1975) ("Restrictions on
free expression are rarely defended on the ground that the state simply didn't like what the defendant was saying; reference will generally be made to some danger beyond the message, such
as a danger of riot, unlawful action or overthrow of the government.").
219 See, e.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937) (noting
that the decision to issue an injunction is within the "sound discretion of the [trial] court").
Noting that inquiry into judicial motive is insulting does not lead to absolute deference
by reviewing courts to lower court decisions. Especially when First Amendment issues are
involved, there is ample reason for a reviewing court to aggressively review evidence and application of legal standards. See infra note 249. An inquiry into actual subjective motivation,
however, is insulting on a personal level and is unwarranted given its difficulties.
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the order itself.220 It is a relatively simple matter for an appellate
court to review the order to determine the reasons for its issuance. To
be sure, injunctions differ. Some are extremely lengthy and specific
while others are only a few sentences. 221 Such disparities may make
identification of objective justifications difficult. 2 In such cases,
however, a reviewing court can resort to the appellate record to ascertain those justifications. At some point in the proceedings, the
plaintiff will have identified the harm to be remedied, thus giving a
reviewing court ample material from which to discern the reasons for
the injunction's issuance. Moreover, to ensure the existence of identifiable justifications, the Court could simply impose more stringent
drafting requirements on injunctions involving First Amendment issues.
Identification of an injunction's objective justification is merely
the first step in this inquiry. Because motives are easily hidden, it
would be foolish to accept such justifications as the final evidence of
motive. Accordingly, a method must be devised to determine which
objective justifications pose illegitimate motive problems and to
guard against the justifications that pose such problems. The next
section examines these issues in depth.
B. Identifying Justificationsand EnsuringThey Are Not Pretextual
To make scrutiny of objective justifications meaningful, a finite
framework of purposes must be devised to provide reviewing courts
with guidance. Otherwise, unrestrained and rigorous purpose scrutiny
"could easily slip into Lochner-esque overreaching .... giv[ing] the
judiciary a blank check to review ...purposes based on a particular
judge's notions of rationality or legitimacy." 223 The Court's past jurisprudence helps in this regard. Three categories of government purposes emerge from past decisions as relevant to a regulation's constitutionality. They are (1) regulations of speech because of hostility
22 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (requiring that a court issuing an injunction "set forth
the reasons for its issuance; ... be specific in [its] terms; [and] ...describe in reasonable detail.
the act or acts sought to be restrained").
221 Compare Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d
1130 (D. Or. 1999) (issuing permanent injunction of 26 pages and containing detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law) with Meyer v. Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1981) (injunction of a few sentences in length).
222 Arguably, an injunction insufficiently specific as to its terms or bases can, and should,
be overturned under traditional remedial requirements aside from First Amendment issues. For
example, a defendant can challenge, as violating a rule of procedure, an order failing to adequately describe the defendant's violation or the acts prohibited. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). A
defendant subject to contempt sanctions may also challenge a poorly drafted injunction as giving insufficient notice of the prohibited conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Joyce, 498 F.2d 592
(7th Cir. 1974).
m Bhagwat, supranote 166, at 320.
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toward the speaker's message (illegitimate purposes), (2) regulation
of speech based upon its communicative effect (disfavored purposes),
and (3) non-hostile and non-communicative impact-related concerns
such as traffic safety or protection of privacy (legitimate purposes).
A court should initially review an injunction's objective justifications
to identify into which of these three categories it falls. After the objective justifications have been appropriately classified, a court can
determine an injunction's constitutionality by applying principles
specifically tailored to each category. The subsections below discuss
this general framework in more detail. While this framework cannot
be exhaustive, it does provide a working outline upon which courts

can rely in handling individual cases.
1. Injunctions Based on Hostility Toward the Speaker's Message
(IllegitimateJustifications)
The Court has long expressed antipathy toward governmental
purposes grounded in hostility toward the message expressed. Thus,
government officials cannot "suppress certain ideas that [they] fimd[]
distasteful. 24 Nor can they protect citizens from expression they
find offensive. 2 5 In effect, the Court has held such motives to be per
se illegitimate. 2 6 Courts should similarly treat an injunction with
objectively identified justifications as falling into this category.

22A City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (stating that government
cannot prohibit speech "merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views");
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (holding that a statute, so broad and vague
that it interferes with free political discussion, conflicts with the Constitution). As Professors
Kagan and Williams note, the government can view a speaker's message with distaste for several reasons-e.g., because the expression criticizes government action, because it believes that
the expression is false, because it sees the speech as threatening an official's own self-interest,
or because it believes citizens are better-off ignorant. See Kagan, supra note 166, at 428-29;
Williams, supra note 156, at 697. Although these reasons differ somewhat, one can still place
them within the more general notion of government disagreement with speech. See Stone, supra note 15, at 227-28.
22 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("'The fact that society
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."') (quoting FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)
("The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to
protect others from hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.").
226 See Stone, supra note 15, at 229 (delineating between improper motives (hostility toward the message) and paternalistic justifications ("concern over the consequences that might
result if others accept the speaker's message")). Under content discrimination principles, the
Court subjects regulations grounded in such justifications to strict scrutiny, which suggests that
even these regulations could be upheld if they met that test's requirements. In practice, however, once the Court perceives a regulation to be grounded in impermissible motive, "the possibility that it [will] be upheld [is] essentially nil" and the application of strict scrutiny pro forma.
Bhagwat, supranote 166, at 328.
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In fact, one can attribute several of the Court's decisions striking
down injunctions to the operation of improper purposes. In Near, for
example, the lower court enjoined certain newspaper publications as a
public nuisance, largely because of their scathing criticism of local
government officials. 22 Although disagreement with the publication
originated with those local officials, the nuisance standard's vagueness allowed the trial court to give effect to that disagreement.22
Thus, Near involved a rare case of open judicial disagreement with
speech-an aspect of the case that clearly concerned the Supreme

Court.229 Other decisions have also involved injunctions suppressing

"offensive" speech. In Keefe, the lower court enjoined distribution of
leaflets potentially embarrassing the respondent real estate broker.230
Similarly, Madsen's no-approach provision prohibited peaceful

speech at least in part because women might have found it upsetting.23' The Supreme Court struck down both of these injunctive pro-

visions. Although it relied heavily on prior restraint or content discrimination rhetoric to support its action, the core of the Court's reasoning came in the notion that protecting people from offense is sim-

ply an insufficient reason to sustain an injunction. 32

2. Injunctions Based on the CommunicativeImpact of Speech
(DisfavoredJustifications)
Some regulations of speech stem not from hostility toward the
expression but from fear that it will persuade or otherwise cause citizens to engage in undesirable behavior. Laws punishing advocacy of
illegal activity, for example, were enacted because officials feared
that the expression would persuade people to engage in that activity.23 3 Laws punishing expression potentially causing an audience to
227 See Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697,705 (1931).
225 The Near statute's allowance of an injunction against all future, similar speech is also

problematic as it allowed a court to censor in the absence of any identifiable harm. Such a
scheme should be considered as per se evidence of improper motive.
229 See Near, 283 U.S. at713.
2o See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971). Since the
injunction prohibited public criticism of the respondent's actions rather than publication of
confidential information, it protected against offense rather than invasion of privacy. See id.
231 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994). Although the
Court acknowledged that the provision aimed at persons who stalked and harassed clinic patients and personnel, to the extent the injunction also prohibited peaceful speech, it essentially
aimed at protecting women from offense. See id.
232 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774 (noting that the prohibition of peaceful "uninvited approaches" violated the idea that "'inpublic debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected
by the Frst Amendment') (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,322 (1988)); Keefe, 402 U.S.
at 419 ("Mhe interest of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices ... [does not] warrant] use of the injunctive power of a court.").
233 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (involving Ohio statute prohibiting
advocacy of the use of violence or terrorism as a form of political reform); Abrams v. United
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become hostile, unrestful, and riotous were motivated by a similar
fear.2 34 In essence, the' government
regulated speech because of its
"communicative impact 35 rather than because of disagreement with
the message. Such regulations are not per se illegitimate, but the
Court disfavors them, subjecting them to rigorous scrutiny and striking them down "'unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest.' ' 2 36 The Court's communicative impact cases thus provide a second category of potential objective justifications underlying injunctions.
There is a potential objection to using "communicative impact"

as a classification. Such regulations present a significant risk of pretexuality; that is, the government's ostensible aim at preventing violence or overthrow of the government may mask hostility toward the
speaker's message.237 In most of the seditious advocacy and hostile
audience cases, for example, the feared harm was so intangible or
unlikely that the Court ultimately characterized the government's
purpose as suppression of unpopular speech.238 Given how closely
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (involving federal statute prohibiting persons from provoking or
encouraging resistance to the war effort).
234 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 234 (1963) (involving civil rights
protestors arrested for violating statute prohibiting "a violation of public order, [or] a disturbance of the public tranquility, by any act or conduct inciting to violence"); Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951) (charging defendant with disorderly conduct for engaging in a speech that
attracted a hostile crowd).
235 See TRIBE, supra note 26, § 12-2, at 789-90 ("[G]overment cannot justify restrictions
on free expression by reference to the adverse consequences of allowing certain ideas or information to enter the realm of discussion and awareness."); Ely, supra note 218, at 1497 (describing regulations based on communicative effect as those where "the harm that the state is
seeking to avert is one that grows out of the fact that the defendant is communicating, and more
particularly out of the way people can be expected to react to his message").
236 Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949)).
See also Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1969) (stating that governments
cannot "regulate conduct connected with these [First Amendment] freedoms through use of
sweeping, dragnet statutes that may, because of vagueness, jeopardize these freedoms"); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (overturning a statute allowing "persons to be punished
merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views"); Williams, supra note 156, at 700 (arguing
for application of a form of strict scrutiny whenever a government regulation targets the communicative impact of speech).
237 In addition to pretextuality, some might argue that there simply is no difference between regulation based on hostility and regulation based on harm stemming from a message. As
Professor Kagan notes, "[w]hat is it, after all, to hate a message if not, and other than, to think
the message causes injury?" Kagan, supranote 166, at 433. As she further points out, however,
sheer dislike of an idea in the abstract and fear that a message will cause people to do something
that is acknowledged as undesirable have distinct characteristics. See id. at 433-34.
238 In Edwards, the Court reversed the conviction of civil rights protestors under a South
Carolina disorderly conduct law because it rested "upon evidence which showed no more than
that [their] opinions.., were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community
to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection." Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237. See also Cox,
379 U.S. at 551 (reversing breach of the peace convictions because they were based on evidence
supporting only that the student protestors' views were unpopular); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 585 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (implying that the seditious advocacy convictions
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entwined "illegitimate" and "disfavored" purposes are, attempts to
distinguish them may be fruitless. Indeed, the Court arguably turned
to content discrimination principles for this reason. Regulations
based upon hostility to a message or communicative impact are generally content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. Given the strong
presumption of unconstitutionality with content-based regulations,
laws based in either justification are unlikely to survive, making distinctions between them irrelevant.
Suspicions regarding an injunction aimed at communicative impact, though legitimate, nevertheless do not justify an irrebuttable
presumption of improper motive. Sometimes the government seeking
to enjoin speech really does, and ought to, fear that it will cause a riot.
There are also occasions when a criminal defendant's rights or national security are substantially endangered by publication of information. In such cases, the harm sought to be avoided is compelling
even if it directly results from the content of expression. Rather than
presume improper motive, a court should try to ensure the veracity of
a justification based in communicative impact by using a test designed to ascertain that the harm is concrete.
The Court's approach in Brandenburg v. Ohio2 39 does just that.
Brandenburg established that government attempts to regulate advocacy of violent lawless activity are constitutional only if advocacy is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and...
likely to incite or produce such action.'' 24 Brandenburg acknowledged that protection against violent, lawless activity was a legitimate
purpose. It also recognized that in previous cases such purposes often
were used pretextually to suppress speech with which the government
disagreed. It thus raised the bar with regulations aimed at communicative impact, requiring that the alleged harm be concrete, likely, and
imminent in order to ensure that speech regulations were actually
aimed at eradicating the state harm.24 1 Applying a Brandenburgstandard to injunctions aimed at communicative impact can similarly
protect against the possibility of illegitimate motive.
That said, the Brandenburgstandard is a balancing test requiring
the Court to weigh the likelihood and magnitude of harm against the
right to free expression. Some commentators argue that courts, unable to compare imponderables, will act out of excessive caution and
suppress speech when it is unwarranted. 242 This certainly was the
of Communist Party leaders were based not in a tangible threat to the government but in "passionate opposition against [their] speech, [and] a revolted dislike for its contents").
29 395 U.S. 444
240 Id. at 447.

(1969).

See Wells, supra note 15, at 179-80 (discussing Brandenburg'sprotection against ille2
gitimate motive).
242 See Blasi, supra note 10, at 49-50; Thomas L Emerson, FirstAmendment Doctrine and
the Burger Court,68 CAL. L. REV. 422,458 (1980).
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case with some versions of Brandenburg's precursor-the clear and
present danger test.243 But Brandenburgdoes not involve the ad hoc
balancing of those earlier cases; rather, it is a "weighted" balancing,
one that heavily favors speech in the absence of concrete evidence of
intentional and likely imminent harm. 2 " Moreover, the earlier cases
occurred when speech protection was still evolving. Balancing in that
context was inevitably unreliable. Brandenburg is a product of a
modem, speech-protective Court. Its already strict test read in this
context signals the need for courts to carefully assess restrictions on
speech.245
Two additional requirements may further allay concerns regarding this standard. First, the Court can require that injunctions issue
only to avoid "serious" harms. Although it has never identified a universe of such harms,2 46 a suitable definition requires that there exist
some threat to democratic government, either through significant
violent activity or damage to other constitutional interests such as another constitutional right.247 Such a definition finds support in the
Court's cases 24 8 and, taken with the basic requirements of Brandenburg, ensures that injunctive relief issues to protect against imminent
invasion of only the most compelling interests. Second, an appellate
7A3 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (holding
that defendant's
attempts to organize Communist Party created a clear and present danger to the United States
government); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (finding that probable effect of
defendant's speech was to obstruct recruiting for the draft and therefore the speech was not
protected).
244 See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine: Some Fragmentsof History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754-55 (1975). See also Martin H.
Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the FirstAmendment: In Defense of Clear and
PresentDanger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1177 (1982) (noting that there can be "weighted" versions of such a test).
24s See Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REv. 395, 410-42 (1995) (noting that judicial doctrine is based upon shared societal
assumptions regarding what actions are appropriate). The weighted balancing of Brandenburg,
read in light of the current strong protection of speech, should result in speech-protective applications of the test.
246 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling GovernmentalInterests: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 932-37 (1988) (noting that
courts rarely identify interests they choose to protect).
247 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction, in PuBLIc VALUES, supra note 186, at 1, 7-8
(arguing for an interpretation of compelling interests as those that can be linked to the Constitution).
248 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea can support even the issuance [of an injunction]."); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1964) (requiring that speech be "likely to produce a clear and
present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest" before the speech can be suppressed); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263
(1941) ("What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle
that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished.").
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court should engage in independent review of the trial court's findings in order to ensure that the Brandenburg standard is both appropriately applied and supported by the evidence. The Court already
engages in such review in other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, 249 and its extension here provides further protection against
illegitimate motive.
A final comment regarding reliance on a Brandenburg-likestandard is in order. Brandenburginvolved incitement of illegal activity,
a specific setting with specific dynamics. Other communicative impact situations may not involve such dynamics. Consequently, application of Brandenburg's precise test may prove inappropriate. Nebraska Press and the Pentagon Papers Case, two of the Court's
prominent prior restraint cases, illustrate this phenomenon. Both
cases involved regulation of speech based upon communicative impact. In the former, the trial court enjoined publication of certain confidential information that it feared would persuade potential jurors as
to the defendant's guilt. In the latter, the government also sought an
injunction prohibiting publication of confidential information 250 that it
thought could be misused. Neither defendant publishing the information intended these harms. Rather, as news organizations, they were
simply reporting on topical matters of interest. In this sense, the defendants lacked the critical Brandenburgrequirement that the speaker
intentionally cause harm. As such, a court applying that standard
would be unable to enjoin such speech, no matter how real the potential harm.
Such a result is troublesome because it ignores the true source of
harm in confidential information situations, which results not from a
speaker's advocacy of illegal activity but from the provision of information. Application of a pure Brandenburgstandard thus prevents
In cases involving regulations of "low-value" speech, the Court routinely examines
evidence to ensure that the lower court's "low-value" determination was correct. The Court
249

explains:
[Tihe limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of particular communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation of special
facts that have been deemed to have constitutional significance.... [T]he Court has
regularly conducted an independent review of the record both to be sure that the
speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and to confine the
perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort
to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.
Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984). See Steven
Alan Childress, ConstitutionalFact and Process:A FirstAmendment Model of CensorialDiscretion,70 TUL L REv. 1229 (1996), for a discussion of the Court's "constitutional fact" doctrine in First Amendment cases.
250 The Court's cases support a governmental right to keep information confidential. See
Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1978) ("[C]onfidentiality is perceived as tending to insure the ultimate effectiveness of the judicial review commissions.").
The Court assumed in Nebraska Pressand the Pentagon Papers Case that the information published therein fell within this category. Obviously, whether information is legitimately the
subject of a confidentiality designation involves an entirely separate determination.
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protection of important non-speech interests in situations where intent
is essentially irrelevant. To remedy this flaw, Brandenburg must be
altered so that injunctions issue after a showing that publication will
likely result in direct, imminent 251 and irreparable damage to defendant's Sixth Amendment rights or national security.
Some may object to deleting the intent requirement as underprotecting speech. 2 With incitement of illegal activity, that may be
true-punishing one who advocates the propriety of illegal activity
absent the intent to cause that activity would chill expression in unacceptable ways and raises motive concerns. A strict causation requirement, however, can adequately protect against suppression in the
confidential information cases, as the Pentagon Papers Case and Nebraska Pressreflect. In the Pentagon Papers Case, the government's
claimed harm to naticnial security interests fell far short of even a
meager causation analysis. The government initially refused to put on
any evidence of harm, instead asserting that it was within the executive branch's discretion to determine whether national security interests warranted suppression. 53 Although it eventually identified specific national security concerns, the government's evidence never
supported a finding that publication would cause the "direct, immediate, and irreparable damage ''g 4 required by several Justices prior to
issuance of an injunction.
The Nebraska Press gag order suffered
from similar problems as evidenced by Chief Justice Burger's pointed

251 Professor Greenawalt argues that "imminence" in the sense of "immediate" is not a
necessary requirement in such situations because the effect of such information "is unlikely to
dissipate itself like the persuasive force of [advocacy] and because possibilities of countervailing communication are much less relevant .... KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND
THE USES OF LANGUAGE 273 (1989). He instead argues in favor of a standard requiring that the
harm be "reasonably likely [to occur] in the 'near future"' and indicates that this period could
last up to "a few months." Id. This seems to be a reasonable approach to imminence in this
context so long as causation requirements are very strict. Other contexts, like seditious advocacy, may require an "imminence in the sense of immediate" requirement. See Redish, supra
note 244, at 1181 (arguing for a "flexible method of determining the level of immediacy needed
in each case").
252 See, e.g., Dow & Shieldes, supra note 157, at 1218-19 (arguing that any version
of the
clear and present danger test should have a requirement that "the speaker's specific intent in
uttering the speech is to cause an unlawful injury").
25 See Sims, supra note 57, at 372.
2
Id. at 375. The government eventually alleged eleven examples of potential national
security problems. See id. Even with these specific allegations, it was never able to produce
evidence of harm sufficient to satisfy the Court. See id at 374.
255Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, argued that an injunction could issue only if
publication would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage." New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
argued that "only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport
already at sea can support the issuance [of an injunction]." l at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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reference to the speculative nature of the harm alleged. 6 In both
cases, a strict causation requirement alone provided ample protection
against suppression based upon improper motive. By stressing the
causation requirement, and modifying Brandenburg's other aspects
when appropriate in particular situations, reviewing courts can use
Brandenburg'sstandard to effectuate the government's interest without giving effect to illegitimate motive and unduly suppressing
speech.5 7
3. LegitimateJustifications
The final category of justifications relevant to purpose scrutiny
involves "legitimate" justifications. Although the universe of legiti-

mate justifications supporting speech regulation is potentially endless,25 8 we can roughly define them as non-negligible259 interests unrelated to hostility or communicative impact of speech that are within
the government's power to protect. Examples include regulation of
noise levels in order to preserve quiet enjoyment of the home; 260 a ban
on disruptive picketing near an elementary school during school hours
in order to preserve the educative process; 261 state common law rules
allowing redress for damage to reputation or privacy interests; 262 and
regulations prohibiting false or misleading advertising in order to prevent consumer fraud.263 While all of these regulations affect expression-controlling its timing, manner and, sometimes, content-their
256 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1976). The Nebraska Press
and the Pentagon Papers Case outcomes are not particularly unusual. According to Professor
Sunstein, "three uncertainties" suggest that the necessary link between publication of confidential information and the feared harm will be difficult to draw: (1) uncertainty regarding whether
information is received in a meaningful way, (2) uncertainty regarding the use to which it will
be put, and (3) uncertainty as to the effect such information will have if it is put to the feared
use. See Cass Sunstein, Government Controlof Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889, 906 (1986).
2s7 Although it is not possible for this Article to list every possible scenario in which the
Brandenburg rationale might arise, Professor Greenawalt has catalogued a number of those
situations along with their appropriate tests. See GREENAWALT, supra note 251, at 260-77.
28 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., IndividualRights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.
REV. 343, 348-51 (1993) (discussing various potential government interests in constitutional
analysis).
2" It is possible, although highly unlikely, for an injunction to be based on an ephemeral
interest. Perhaps even more than legislatures, judges "do not [issue] wholly useless" orders.
Ely, supra note 218, at 1486. The requirement that plaintiffs seeking equitable relief allege a
threatened invasion of a concrete right seems adequate protection against this problem.
26 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (involving law requiring use of
certain approved amplification equipment during concert performances); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949) (involving law prohibiting use of sound trucks in residential areas).
261 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
262 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (involving common law libel);

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (involving false light invasion of privacy tort).
m See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (discussing validity of state regulations of false and misleading
advertising).
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justifications are well within governmental power to regulate. Indeed,
these are interests that the government should protect.
Of course, allowing substantial regulation of speech based upon
such interests runs the risk that government will act pretextuallywhat better way for officials to get what they want than to put forward
a seemingly innocuous reason for regulation? Accordingly, a reviewing court must ensure that an injunction seeking to protect legitimate
interests is what it purports to be. In doing so, it is necessary to identify the nature of the speech at which the injunction aims. Specifically, we must determine whether the injunction regulates "highvalue" speech-speech made as a contribution to public discourse (as
in the noise level and picketing examples above)-or "low-value"
speech-speech that does not contribute to public discourse (as in the
libel, invasion of privacy, and false commercial speech examples).
Although regulation of both types of speech may aim at legitimate
interests, the Court approaches them differently. In light of this different treatment, the following sections elaborate on the proper
method for evaluating legitimate justifications.
a. High-Value Speech
In defining the parameters of high-value speech, the Court adheres to the central philosophical tenet that "the First Amendment
'embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly... all matters of
public concern. ' ' ' 264 This conviction should also inform the Court's
assessment of legitimate justifications for restrictions on high-value
speech. Specifically, an injunction that restricts a speaker's participation in public discourse should indicate a potentially improper motive. In this sense, the term "participate" requires that the speaker be
able to maintain effective communication with her intended audience.
Few injunctions aimed at eradicating non-communicative harms need
unduly interfere with such communication. Injunctions that do so are
suspect and should be struck down.265
2
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 (1980) (quoting
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)); accord Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). See also
Robert C. Post, Community and the FirstAmendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473, 481 (1997) (defining public discourse as "the speech necessary for the formation of public opinion").
The proposed test simply serves as a proxy for illegitimate motive. It does not indicate
that illegitimate motive necessarily exists. Thus, a reviewing court should remand to the lower
court. If that court can sufficiently tailor the injunction to maintain the speaker/audience relationship, no further motive inquiry is necessary and the reviewing court should uphold it. If,
however, the lower court makes clear that other justifications are the basis for the injunction, the
reviewing court can then judge it under the test appropriate for that category. This approach
avoids a possibly insulting imputation of actual illegitimate/disfavored motive in situations
where the lower court was simply careless. It also avoids the possibility that the reviewing court
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Judging an injunction under this standard requires a two-pronged
inquiry. A court must first identify the audience at whom the speaker
aims. Much of the time, this question is relatively easy. Many
speakers simply want "the public" to hear their views and have no
direct constituency in mind. For example, the New York Times published the Pentagon Papers primarily to inform United States citizens
about the actions of their government. Sometimes, however, speakers
have multiple audiences. In Madsen, for example, the anti-abortion
protestors wanted to reach the public generally, but they also specifically aimed their anti-abortion message at the targeted clinic's patients and personnel.2 66 A court attempting to tailor an injunction
must be aware of both audiences. Audience identification is thus
largely dependent upon the context and manner of the speech and,
ultimately, is a matter of common sense.267 A reviewing court, for
example, can presume that anti-abortion protestors standing near a
clinic desire to reach a specific audience in addition to the general
public. In contrast, anti-war protestors outside of the post office more
likely have a general audience in mind since there is little relationship
between the subject of their protest and its location.268
A reviewing court's next task is to determine whether the injunction is sufficiently tailored to allow a speaker to reach the intended audience(s). While this inquiry is also contextual, depending
upon circumstances unique to each case, it need not be ad hoc. In
assessing the legitimacy of an injunction restricting high-value
speech, courts should operate on the principle that an injunction
should allow the speaker to reach "roughly the same audience ... in
size and character" without distorting the speaker's message by making it shorter, less detailed, or less effective than via the speaker's
proposed means of communication.2 69 This principle does not require
that an injunction ensure availability of the most effective means of
communication with the audience. But an injunction which interferes
with or diminishes the communicative aspect of speech-the reason
will guess wrong as to whether the actual motive is illegitimate or disfavored (no small distinction given that the tests for each are very different).
266 See Brief for Petitioners at 23, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753
(1994) (No. 93-880).
27 See C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and
Tune, Place,and Manner Regulations,78 Nw. U. L. REV. 937, 969-970 (1983) (arguing that an
analysis of the intended audience is necessary when considering alternate methods of expression
available after an injunction is issued).
m Hypothetical anti-postal service protestors, however, would present a situation more
like Madsen as they would presumably want to reach postal customers and the service itself in
addition to the general public.
269 Williams, supra note 156, at 716. Professor Williams proposes this test in the context
of the Court's current intermediate scrutiny, essentially asking the Court to "put some teeth"
back into the adequate alternatives prong of its existing test. IL
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that the speaker substantively values this particular expressive activity-should be struck down as interfering with the speaker/audience
relationship.
To build on an example from Professor Baker, assume a group of
aniti-fur advocates want to demonstrate at the mayor's office. 270 Their
desire to do so simply to gain access to a larger media audience (because they know the press is more likely to cover their protest) is not
"substantively valued communicative interaction" but merely a means
to achieve greater notoriety. On the other hand, if anti-fur advocates
wish to demonstrate at the mayor's office because of her policies regarding the fur trade, their desire to use that particular location becomes part of the communicative aspect of their expression. An injunction banning the latter demonstration interferes with the
speech/audience relationship far more than a ban on the former, even
though the injunctions might be identical.271 In effect, the speaker's
purpose in disseminating the message, which can be deduced from the
context of the speech, informs the tailoring requirement. While it is
not possible to list all possible permutations of this principle, an examination of the Court's injunction cases reveals some rough guideposts regarding restrictions that unreasonably interfere with the
speaker/audience relationship.
1. Suppression of Communication. By definition, an injunction
banning expression altogether interferes with communication between
speaker and audience. Only the rarest of noise control justifications,
for example, necessitates a complete ban on communication rather
than a tailored injunction restricting noise levels. Such bans are far
more likely to aim at communicative impact or to reflect hostility toward the ideas expressed. Several of the cases in which the Court
270 See Baker, supra note 267, at 971-72. The structure of this example brings up the nonpublic forum doctrine which, although far too complicated to deal with in-depth here, is worth
special mention. By desiring to locate in the mayor's office, the demonstrators move from the
realm of public fora (e.g., streets, parks, sidewalks) to non-public fora (e.g., other government
property). While the Court maintains reasonably strong protection of speech in public fora, it
traditionally allows the government far greater leeway in regulating non-public fora. See supra
note 158. The proposed test does not distinguish between kinds of government property. Instead, it judges an injunction depending upon the government's interest in bringing a lawsuit
and on the injunction's effect on the speaker/audience relationship. While the government often
has a legitimate interest in managing its non-public fora, that interest may occasionally be subordinated to the speaker/audience relationship in certain circumstances. In this way, this test
may bring about quite different results from the Court's current, deferential approach to regulations in non-public fora.
271 See Baker, supra note 267, at 971-72. Professor Williams makes a similar distinction,
contrasting the facilitative aspect of speech--"that part of the speech activity which the speaker
uses to aid in the transmission or receipt of the message"--and the communicative aspect of
speech-any part of speech that "play[s] a role in the representation of the message." Williams,
supra note 156, at 660. She argues that the regulation of the former aspect of speech is less
worrisome than the latter. See id. at 660-62.
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found injunctions to be prior restraints reflect this phenomenon as
they involved injunctions suppressing communication because of potential harm resulting from the speech itself or because of government
dislike of the speech. 272 In contrast, none of the cases in which the
Court upheld injunctions based upon legitimate justifications involved
suppression of speech.273
2. Temporary Suppression of Speech. Temporary suppression
of speech, such as a ban on communication for seven days, also
amounts to unreasonable interference with the speaker/audience relationship. To be sure, a temporary ban, which allows the expression to
inform public deliberation at some point, is less threatening than perpetual suppression. But timeliness is often a critical element of

speech:
[P]ublic interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however
penetrating, of the historian or scientist.... Punish[ment of]
utterances made during the pendency of a [lawsuit, for example, may] produce ... restrictive results at the precise time
when public interest in the matters discussed would naturally
be at its height.... An endless series of moratoria on public
discussion, even if each were very short, could hardly be
dismissed274as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of expression.

272See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (enjoining publication of the Pentagon Papers based upon fear that it would interfere with national security);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971) (enjoining protestors from
passing out pamphlets, leaflets, literature or engaging in protests that criticized real estate broker's business practices); Near v. Minnesota er rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (enjoining publication of current and future editions of newspaper that criticized government officials).
273See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (vacating part of injunction banning protests within 30-feet of clinic entrances because of safety and access concerns but upholding part allowing protests in other areas near clinic); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (involving court order banning disclosure of confidential information
learned through the discovery process because of need to preserve integrity of legal system but
allowing publication of that information if learned through other means); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding injunction banning
sex-segregated advertisements based upon interest in eradicating sex-discrimination but allowing criticism of policy disallowing segregation); Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (upholding injunction against protests in the immediate vicinity of certain milk stores because of significant problems with violence but allowing protests
in other areas).
274Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1941) (reversing contempt order for publishing material critical of the judicial process during the pendency of a criminal case). See also
Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) ("The present
case involves a rally and 'political' speech in which the element of timeliness may be important."); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It is vital to the operation of democratic government that the citizens have facts and
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Just as with complete suppression, the state's police power interests
will rarely, if ever, justify such a ban. For example, a temporary ban
on anti-abortion protests does not suggest that the city is merely trying to avoid traffic problems because it could achieve the same result
with a much narrower injunction restricting the protestors to the
sidewalk. Temporary suppression in this instance suggests that
something more is behind the injunction, such as a desire to discourage the protestors or diminish public interest. The Court's past cases
generally
bear out that injunctions temporarily suppressing speech
5
arise out of fear of communicative impact or hostility.
3. Bans on a Medium of Communication. Rather than suppressing speech, most injunctions based upon legitimate justifications
merely regulate aspects of it. Nevertheless, even limited regulation
can interfere with the speaker/audience relationship, especially bans
on a particular format of communication. Assume the Madsen trial
court enjoined all mass demonstrations by anti-abortion protestors
because they continuously blocked traffic. Such an injunction would
leave protestors free to communicate in a variety of ways; they could
still individually leaflet, purchase radio/television time or newspaper
space, or communicate through telephone calls and door-to-door appeals. Despite these alternative modes of communication, the injunction still interferes with the speaker/audience relationship. The protestors chose their mode of communication for a reason. Mass demonstrations send a message of intensity and unity on a topic that other
methods of communication cannot. As Professor Baker notes:
Even if demonstrators would be happy to persuade officials
merely on the basis of reason, logic, or the rightness of their
position, dissidents... recognize that their presence is a form
of power that pressures the authorities into paying attention
and then into making some response. Dissidents unabashedly and properly try peaceably but forcefully to impose
numbers, solipressure through the intimidation produced by 276
darity, and the spotlight of their mass presence.

ideas on important issues before them. A delay of even a day or two may be of crucial importance in some instances.").
275 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 545 (1976) (involving a temporary
ban on publication of inculpatory information). As in the suppression cases, that temporary gag
order aimed not at what this Article characterizes as a "legitimate" justification but as a disfavored one-i.e., fear that the information would persuade others of the defendant's guilt. See
also Carroll,393 U.S. 175 (seeking injunction because officials feared white supremacist rally
would cause riots).
276 Baker, supra note 267, at 1015; see also Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S. at 293 (discussing the necessity of picketing in the labor context).
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A ban on demonstrations thus inhibits effective communication by
forcing the protestors to use watered-down versions of their speech to
reach the public.277 The impact upon their attempt to reach the patient/personnel audience is even more severe as the injunction prevents them from amassing anywhere near that audience. Finally, because the court could manage the legitimate concern of traffic control

with a more limited ban restricting protestors from assembling in or
blocking the street, its failure to do so raises the possibility that the
court's true motive may be hostility toward the message.
Format bans will not always amount to unreasonable interference
with communication, but the Court has recognized that such bans often have that impact. Accordingly, the Court tends to view them with
suspicion.278 This is especially true when the banned medium is relatively cheap and traditionally thought of as an essential form of com279

munication, such as leafleting, personal solicitation, and protests.

Madsen's refusal to uphold an injunctive provision prohibiting any
personal approaches by individual protestors near an abortion clinic
reflects the Court's reluctance to restrict such modes of communication. Personal solicitation is perhaps the most important means of
communication for such protestors. 280 To prohibit anti-abortion advocates from personally appealing to potential abortion patients is a
serious blow to their communication with that particular audience 28 1
and raises concerns that the motive underlying the injunction aimed at
277

The Court has recognized that diluting a message's intensity may violate the Frst

Amendment. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
m See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down law banning
homeowners from displaying signs on their property); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
146 (1943) (striking down municipal ban on distribution of door-to-door circulars). See also

Stone, supra note 15, at 190-92 n.5 (discussing cases striking down laws severely restricting
effective modes of communication).
279 See, e.g., Martin,319 U.S. at 143 (noting that distribution of door-to-door circulars was
essential to poorly financed and unpopular causes).
= See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 148 (1939) (striking down ordinance prohibiting
"a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it"); see
also Darrin Alan Hostetler, Note, Face-to-Facewith the First Amendment: Schenck v. ProChoice Network and the Right to "Approach and Offer" in Abortion Clinic Protests,50 STAN.
L REV. 179, 192-205 (1997) (discussing the importance of personal approaches in free speech
jurispudence).
I In describing their goals as sidewalk counselors, anti-abortion protestors emphasized
the need for personal interaction:
Sidewalk counseling consists of personal communication with pregnant women,
their companions, or passersby, typically by conversation or by the distribution of
written literature.... The sidewalk counselor seeks not so much to broadcast a
message to the world as to touch the mind, heart, and conscience of particular individuals. The goal of the sidewalk counselor is to offer information and assistance to
help a woman carry her baby to term.... Such verbal persuasion and protest rest at
the very heart of the right to free speech.
Brief for Petitioners at 19-20, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (No. 951065) (citations and footnote omitted).
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something other than protecting legitimate interests. 28 2 Thus, certain
format bans may be more likely than others to pose problems.
4. Insufficiently Tailored Speech Zones. Many regulations of
speech are simply straightforward attempts to impose time, place, and
manner requirements without suppressing the medium or the message. Nonetheless, these too can interfere with the speaker/audience
relationship if insufficiently tailored. In Madsen, the trial court enjoined protests within 300 feet of clinic personnel homes ostensibly to
protect against targeted picketing (picketing aimed at a particular
residence and specifically designed to intrude upon the privacy of the
home). While protection of such privacy is a legitimate interest,U' in
this case, the size of the buffer zone-the length of a football fieldwas far too large to aim only at targeted picketing. As such, it interfered with the protestors' ability to communicate with other audiences, including the physicians' immediate neighbors. The lack of
"fit" in such an injunction and its interference with the
speaker/audience relationship thus raises suspicion that it may aim at
something more than mere privacy interests.
One could argue that the proposed approach regarding legitimate
justifications looks remarkably like the intermediate scrutiny associated with content-neutral statutes, which requires that regulations
leave open ample alternatives for communication of information.7 4
Given this Article's criticism that such balancing is insufficiently
m The Madsen Court viewed this provision as attempting to protect women entering the
clinic from offense-a purpose this Article would classify as illegitimate. See Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994). In contrast, the Court upheld a similar
provision in Schenck. The Schenck provision, however, required that the protestors be allowed
to approach women within the buffer zone as long as they desisted upon the women's request.
See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 364. By allowing the protestors an opportunity to solicit the women,
the Schenck injunction did not interfere with the speaker/audience relationship. See Alan E.
Brownstein, Rules of Engagementfor Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, UnprotectedSpeech,
and ProtectedExpression in Anti-Abortion Protests-Section11, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1163,
1183 (1996) (discussing the "receptivity of the audience" as an important factor in evaluating
the freedom of speech); Hostetler, supra note 280, at 191 (comparing the Schenck injunction to
that in Madsen).
283 In Frisby v. Schultz, the Court explained the interest underlying regulation of targeted
picketing:
Th[is] type of focused picketing prohibited.., is fundamentally different from more
generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in
residential areas. In such cases, the "flow of information [is not] into ... household[s], but to the public." Here, in contrast, the picketing is narrowly directed at
the household, not the public. The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to
intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.
487 U.S. 474,486 (1988) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
24 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764-65 (discussing the need to narrowly tailor injunctive relief
that impacts upon freedom of expression); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (finding rules against sleeping overnight on Park Service grounds allowed
ample alternative means of expression).
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protective of speech, u5 there is a logical question as to whether this
proposal is much better. The critical difference comes in the concrete
nature of the proposed approach. The Court's intermediate scrutiny
tests are formulaic and have little content. They tell courts to balance
"significant" interests against the need for free speech, to ensure that
the regulation is "narrowly tailored" or "burdens no more speech than
necessary," and to leave open "ample alternatives of communication."
But they do not provide courts with tangible factors needed to effectuate that balancing, instead asking them to assess restrictions in a
vacuum. In contrast, the proposed approach focuses the court on the
single most important question regarding the injunction--does it
maintain the speaker/audience relationship? And it further gives
courts specific guideposts to answer that question, such as the nature
of the audience and the speaker's purpose in disseminating the message. Thus, although the proposed test involves balancing, it is a
much more vital process than the formulaic current approach.2 6 It is
less likely that the problems arising with ad hoc balancing will arise
here.
b. Low-Value Speech
Injunctions pertaining to low-value speech are a different matter.
By definition, low-value speech does not contribute to public discourse.2 7 Thus, the Court allows substantial regulation, even suppression, of speech falling into low-value categories, such as obscenity, 8 fighting words, 289 libel, 290 and some forms of commercial
speech. 29' In the context of injunctive relief, the requirement that the
speaker be able to maintain effective communication with her audience is unnecessary. Instead, injunctions suppressing low-value
speech are constitutional as long as they issue in accordance with the
Court's requirements for a particular category.
2 See supranotes 178-89 and accompanying text.
286 See Aleinikoff, supranote 186, at 992-93 (discussing the "heady realism that informed
early balancing opinions").
27 The court has determined that certain categories of speech are "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and ... of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit...
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
= See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476

(1957).
29 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568.
290 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250(1952).
29' While the Court currently accords substantial protection to truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech, see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), it still allows
suppression of false and misleading advertisements and advertisements proposing illegal transactions, see Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (finding advertisement for drug
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The Court currently takes such an approach in the obscenity
context. Thus, an injunction satisfies the First Amendment as long as
the court issuing the injunction finds that the specific expression to be
enjoined meets the Court's definition of obscenity.2 92 Although the
Supreme Court has not explicitly extended that reasoning to other
forms of low-value speech, it should be applied to these other forms,
as well. A court properly finding that certain statements are libelous3
and satisfy the requirements of New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan
and its progeny, 294 for example, should be able to enjoin further
communication of those particular statements. In fact, numerous
lower courts have issued injunctions against libelous statements relying on the reasoning in the Court's obscenity jurisprudence. 295 Similarly, a court order prohibiting false and misleading commercial
speech would survive First Amendment scrutiny if issued after a sufficient determination that the speech at issue fell into that category.296
Requiring courts to determine the low-value nature of expression
prior to issuing an injunction is critical to the injunction's legitimacy.
The Court's own determination of low-value speech walks a tightrope
between legitimate and illegitimate motive. The Court, for instance,
finds fighting words punishable because they amount to an assault
rather than communication of ideas.297 The Court is quick to circumscribe this category, however, noting that fighting words must "have a
direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, indiparaphernalia not to be protected speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that while commercial speech enjoys
some protection under the First Amendment, that protection does not extend to false or misleading advertisements).
292 See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (upholding New York
statute authorizing injunction against distribution of obscenity because statute required a finding
of obscenity with respect to specific material prior to injunction). See also Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (finding injunction against defendant movie theater prohibiting future exposition of films to be an impermissible prior restraint).
293 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (requiring that public officials suing for libel prove that
statements contain a false statement of fact made with actual malice).
294 Several subsequent cases elaborate upon the requirements imposed by the Frst
Amendment. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967).
295 See, e.g. Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn.
1984) (upholding an injunction prohibiting the release of libelous material); O'Brien v. University Comm. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ohio 1975) (comparing libelous speech
with obscene speech); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975) (comparing
false and defamatory speech with obscene speech in upholding a prior restraint injunction).
296 The Supreme Court has indicated that injunctions against commercial speech are acceptable. See Virginia State Bd., 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. Lower courts, however, have not consistently applied this principle. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note Ill, at 223 n.331. Presumably, the Court will need to clarify this area of the law.
29' See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (characterizing fighting
words as "personal abuse").
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vidually, the remark is addressed." 298 Regulations aimed more
broadly at speech which merely offends or angers are the result of
illegitimate motives and are unconstitutional. 299 Thus, injunctions
purporting to aim at low-value speech but which are insufficiently
tailored should be struck down. The Court's rejection of the Keefe

injunction illustrates this problem. Although the lower court based its
injunction in a privacy rationale,300 an arguably low-value speech
category,30 ' the Supreme Court noted that public criticism of public
activities did not amount to an invasion of privacy and intimated that
the injunction was based in impermissible purposes.3°
V. SOME MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES REGARDING INJUNCTIONS
The preceding sections advocated substituting substantive standards in place of the Court's empty prior restraint rhetoric. While
these standards cover most aspects of injunctive relief, a few issues
specific to the form of injunctive relief nevertheless remain. This
section first explores whether certain procedural aspects of injunctions-the collateral bar rule and the judicial contempt power-support strong antipathy to all injunctions. It then examines whether
there should be special hostility to interim injunctive relief, whether
that relief comes in the form of a temporary restraining order or a

preliminary injunction.

29

Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972) (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d

754,758 (N.H. 1941)).
299 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989) (overturning conviction for flagburning); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that a state may not criminally
punish the use of four-letter expletives). See Wells, supra note 15, at 177-86, for further discussion on the manner in which the Court's low-value speech determinations guard against illegitimate motive.
3w See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,418 (1971).
301 The Supreme Court has avoided deciding whether the First Amendment protects publication of truthful private facts, see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975), although it has intimated that there may be no such protection. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491
U.S. 524, 533 (1989). Lower courts have issued injunctions if publication squarely violates
traditionally recognized privacy rights. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (issuing injunction against publication of magazine that used full-frontal nude
drawing of plaintiff without his consent and for which he never posed); Commonwealth v.
Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969) (affirming injunction against public display of a film
determined to be a significant invasion of privacy rights of inmates in institute for the criminally
insane).
3'2 See Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418-19; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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A. The CollateralBarRule and the Contempt Power
Some commentators argue that the collateral bar rule supports
special disfavor of injunctions. The rule prevents a person who intentionally violates an injunction from raising its unconstitutionality
in later criminal contempt proceedings. °3 A party subject to an injunction thus stands in a far different position from one who violates a
similar criminal law because the latter can raise the law's unconstitutionality as a defense. As a result, some commentators argue that "[a]
prior restraint... stops more speech more effectively. A criminal
statute chills, prior restraint freezes. ' 3°
It is not clear, however, that the collateral bar rule causes injunctions to be a greater deterrent than subsequent punishment. There is
little empirical evidence to support such a claim. 30 5 Moreover, the
collateral bar rule does not greatly differentiate the mechanism of
punishment in each situation. As Professor Fiss explains:

[T]he sanctioning system of the classic . . .preventive injunction, can be seen to resemble that of the criminal prohibition. In issuing a preventive injunction the court promulgates a rule of conduct and also (implicitly) threatens to impose sanctions-jail or fine-for a violation.... [T]he aim
is not simply to internalize the costs to the victim but to stop
the prohibited act or to enhance the power of the court to stop
acts that it might prohibit. Of course, as with criminal prohibitions, on occasion the ambition of the preventive injunction
may go unfulfilled. To state the obvious, an injunction can
be violated. The rule of Walker v. City of Birmingham-denying a criminal contemnor the right to contest the constitutional validity of the injunction-may strengthen the threat of
punishment by enhancing the certainty of infliction, but it
3 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding contempt convictions for violating an injunction prohibiting expressive activity without a permit even though
permit law upon which injunction was based was later found unconstitutional). The Court justifies the collateral bar rule with the statement that "respect for judicial process is a small price to
pay for the civilizing hand of law." Id. at 321.
304 BICKEL, supra note 102, at 61.
305 Many point to the New York Times's willingness to risk criminal prosecution but not
contempt sanctions regarding the Pentagon Papers as evidence that injunctions have a greater
chilling effect. The Pentagon Papers Case vignette, however, is far from conclusive. It is
entirely possible, for example, that the Times's promise to obey the injunction was not "evidence of the injunction's greater force, but.., a bargaining ploy, a way of inducing the Attorney General not to prosecute the Times under the Espionage Act." Owen Fiss, Free Speech and
the PriorRestraint Doctrine:The Pentagon PapersCase, in THE SUPREME COURT AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 49, 63 n.9 (Burke Marshall ed., 1982). Moreover, there is some evidence that the press
has ignored gag orders on publication of information. See James C. Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The PracticalEffect on Gag OrderLitigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,
29 STAN. L. REv. 497, 505-06 (1977).
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does not guarantee that the threat will be successful in preventing the proscribed conduct. 0 6
In addition, the collateral bar rule's status is uncertain, with courts
increasingly unwilling to apply it in First Amendment cases. 30 7 Even
if that rule remains applicable and has a heightened chilling effect, the
Court's potential exceptions to its application ought to ameliorate
much of that effect.30 8 Moreover, the Court has insisted upon heightened procedural safeguards with speech-restricting injunctions, such
as immediate appellate review and a stay of
the injunction during ap39
peal, which further protect against chilling. 0
Aside from the collateral bar rule, some commentators further
argue that unrestrained judicial power to punish is reason enough to
disfavor injunctions against expression. Judges have significant and
unrestrained contempt powers allowing them to find facts, make law
and rule on violations of their orders without a jury and under lower
standards of evidence than in criminal trials. A speaker subject to an
injunction thus has every reason to obey it even if it violates the First
Amendment. 310 While true to some extent, this argument overstates
the power of judges. A judge's ability to impose criminal contempt

sanctions for violations is increasingly limited. A contemnor is entitled to a jury trial and substantial procedural protections in most
criminal contempt proceedings. 31 1 The Supreme Court recently ex-

306 Fiss, supra note 10, at 33-34; see also sources cited infra note 311. Arguments for
elimination of the collateral bar rule, however, still have merit. The rule creates an inconsistency in the Court's jurisprudence because it treats two similarly situated speakers differently.
See FlSS, supranote 10, at 30. From a simple fairness perspective, eliminating the collateral bar
rule in free speech cases equalizes the footing of both speakers.
37 State courts increasingly refuse to apply the rule. See State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353
(Wash. 1984) (overturning a contempt judgment against a broadcaster for broadcasting tape
recording previously played in open court); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 418
P.2d 594 (Ariz. 1966) (allowing a reporter, who violated a contempt order, to defeat a contempt
of court charge on constitutional grounds). See also Blasi, supra note 10, at 22 n.47 (listing
state courts that have refused to apply the collateral bar rule); Doug Rendleman, Free PressFair Trial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C. L. REV. 127, 148 (1973) (suggesting that the
collateral bar rule should not be applied in silence-order contempt charges). The Supreme Court
has also declined to apply the rule in subsequent decisions. See Blasi, supranote 10, at 21.
308 Walker held that the collateral bar rule did not apply if an injunction was "transparently
invalid" or if those subject to a court order faced "delay or frustration" while contesting its
validity. 388 U.S. at 315, 318. Scholars argue that such exceptions are likely to apply in First
Amendment cases, thus limiting the rule's scope. See Jeffries, supranote 5, at 432-33 (arguing
that the collateral bar rule must be carefully circumscribed when applied to speech).
m See, e.g., National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43,44 (1977).
310 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,793 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Rendleman, supra note 210, at 1665.
311 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (holding that defendant is entitled to a jury
trial if criminal contempt sentence exceeds six months); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1948)
(holding that defendant is entitled to public trial in criminal contempt proceedings); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (requiring procedural safeguards such as
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31 2
tended those protections to coercive civil contempt proceedings
when the contempt involves continuing out-of-court violations of a
complex court order.313 Given that these forms of contempt are a
judge's most powerful weapon, checks on their use at least partly responds to concerns regarding abuse. Moreover, potential abuse of
contempt power should not automatically translate into disfavor of

injunctions against expression. A more logical approach, for example, is to fix the contempt power by requiring that contempt hearings
be held before judges other than the one issuing the order.
B. Interim Injunctive Relief
The proposed approach to injunctions assumes that the injunction involved (a permanent injunction) issues only after a full hearing
on the merits.3 1 5 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
most state counterparts, temporary restraining orders can issue ex
parte and after a truncated hearing involving little more than affida-

vits as evidence.31 6 While preliminary injunctions usually require an
adversarial hearing held after sufficient notice,317 the presentation of
facts and law is often substantially curtailed compared to a full
trial.31 8 The question naturally arises as to whether these forms of
relief sufficiently change the dynamics in free speech cases to warrant
special hostility.

presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and privilege against selfincrimination in criminal contempt proceedings).
332 Coercive civil contempt sanctions (either fines or jail time) are imposed to coerce a
party into complying with a court order in the future. They accumulate as the contemnor refuses
to comply but can be stopped at any time by compliance. See Latrobe Steel Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1344 (3d Cir. 1976). In contrast, criminal contempt sanctions are
imposed for past violations and cannot be avoided. See generally LAYCOCK, supra note 204, at
716-24.
313 See United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
314 See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 79-80
(1993). In fact, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 provides for disqualification of the
presiding judge when a contempt involves "disrespect to or criticism of a judge." See FED. R.
CRim. P. 42(b).
31- The term "permanent" injunction does not imply an order that lasts in perpetuity but
instead refers to an order issuing after a full trial. It serves mainly as a signal distinguishing that
injunction from orders that issue before a full trial. See DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, §
2.11(1), at 184 (2d ed. 1993).
316 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (allowing temporary restraining orders to issue ex
parte).
317 Notice is a mandatory requirement for preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
P. 65(a)(1). Practices differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within states, as local courts
often prescribe their own rules.
318 Although the party against whom a preliminary injunction is sought is generally entitled
to an evidentiary hearing, see Professional Plan Exam'rs of New Jersey, Inc. v. LeFante, 750
F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 1984), those hearings can be truncated, dispensing with oral testimony
and cross examination and relying instead on documents or affidavits. See Elliott v. Kiesewet-
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Because so much of this Article's proposed approach to injunctions requires a court to make contextual assessments of likely harm
and impact upon expression, complete evidentiary findings and deliberate assessment of facts are essential. The more truncated and hurried the hearing, the less likely that the injunction results from accurate application of the proposed standards and the more likely that it
may reflect impermissible motive. This is most obviously true when

an injunction aims at communicative impact. There is a significant
danger that courts under time pressure and forced to speculate regarding potential harm based upon inadequate evidence will allow
"groundless fears to figure in the rationale for suppression," thus dis-

torting the decision-making process. 319 Even an injunction aiming at
legitimate, non-communicative harms may raise this problem. The
potential for illegitimate motive is less in such circumstances but it is
not nonexistent and the hurried nature of the hearing exacerbates that
potential. Moreover, the record resulting from hearings involving

interim injunctions may be insufficient for a reviewing court to satisfy
itself as to the justification for the injunction.
In light of these concerns, a special antipathy (although not a
complete bar320 ) toward interim injunctions is warranted. Temporary
restraining orders are especially suspect. The Supreme Court has
ruled as much with ex parte temporary restraining orders because of
the lack of notice to the opposing party.321 Even absent notice problems, however, a hearing on a temporary restraining order will seldomresent a sufficient opportunity to develop an evidentiary record.
Consequently, a reviewing court will be unable adequately to
assess the materiality or legitimacy of the harm. Any such order
regulating speech thus rests on dubious grounds. At the very least,
ter, 98 F.3d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1996); Consolidated Gold v. Minorco, 871 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir.
1989); see also FSS, supra note 10, at 28-29.
319 Blasi, supra note 10, at 49. Professor Blasi makes this argument in the context of permanent injunctions as well, noting that all injunctions regarding communicative impact require a
court to speculate regarding the harm that speech will cause. As Professor Redish points out,
however, even subsequent punishment schemes aiming at communicative impact require some
speculation regarding the harm speech will cause. See Redish, supra note 30, at 68-69. The
Court has responded to this problem in the subsequent punishment context by requiring concrete
proof of imminent and serious harm. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text. An injunction issued after a full evidentiary hearing should also be able to implement this standard.
32 Sometimes, albeit rarely, an immediate injunction may be the only way to guard against
a serious evil. The classic example involves disclosure of information that would put United
States citizens in immediate peril. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
726 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
321See Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
= This is partly why most jurisdictions do not allow appeals of temporary restraining
orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (permitting appeals of final orders and preliminary injunctions); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHfT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 708 (4th ed. 1983) (stating
that federal law does not allow appeal of temporary restraining orders).
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temporary orders restraining speech should issue only in emergency
situations where there exists concrete and unassailable proof that the
party's interests cannot be protected by a later hearing.3 In addition,
the Court's requirement of immediate appellate review and a stay of
the injunction 324 must be strictly enforced. Appellate courts should
also engage in independent review of the record to ensure
adequate
3
application of the law and sufficient evidence of harm. 25
Preliminary injunctions pose fewer problems than temporary restraining orders. Although they typically involve truncated hearings
and more informal evidentiary procedures, they generally do not occur in emergency situations requiring such an approach. Consequently, a court can issue a preliminary injunction consistent with the
First Amendment if it holds a reasonably thorough hearing and issues
significant written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 326 For a
preliminary injunction to satisfy those requirements, the court must
hold an adversarial hearing that resembles, as closely as possible, a
full trial, including adherence to evidentiary rules, live testimony in
addition to documents and affidavits, and an opportunity for crossexamination. The procedural protections and aggressive appellate
review discussed above must also be available, as well.
CONCLUSION

Bright line rules often seem like a good thing. Teachers find
them easy to teach. Students, lawyers, and judges find them easy to
apply. For years, the Court's nearly insurmountable presumption
against injunctions appeared to be such a rule. Given the often overwhelming complexity of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
this readily identifiable antipathy toward prior restraints seemed like a
blessing-something we could count on in a morass of changing
323 Professor Redish notes that equity doctrine may already allay fears regarding issuance
of temporary restraining orders based upon speculative harm. See Redish, supranote 30, at 88.
In order to obtain a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff must show a likelihood that significant irreparable injury will result before a preliminary injunction hearing can be held. See, e.g.,
DOBBS, supra note 315, § 2.11(2), at 193-94. Nevertheless, judges have a great deal of discretion to issue injunctions and this otherwise high threshold is subject to their individual beliefs.
Incorporation of the irreparable injury standard into First Amendment doctrine and independent
appellate review of the record better protects First Amendment interests. See Redish, supranote
30, at 88.
32 See National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (overturning an injunction
refusing to allow plaintiffs to march in parade).
325 See Redish, supranote 30, at 88-89 (arguing for abandonment of "abuse of discretion"
standard when appellate courts review preliminary injunctions).
326 Some courts already require an evidentiary hearing in lawsuits seeking a preliminary
injunction where "essential facts" are in dispute. See Consolidated Gold v. Minorco, 871 F.2d
252, 256 (2d Cir. 1989). Extending this requirement to First Amendment cases is consistent
with this trend.
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doctrines. When the Court raises rhetoric to the level of a rule without explanation, however, its doctrine is empty and provides no
framework for resolving difficult cases. That this particular bright
line rule was not really a bright line rule at all further exacerbates this
problem. Although the Court never disfavored all injunctions against
speech, its elevation of prior restraint rhetoric has skewed our understanding of the doctrine.
The Court must establish a coherent doctrinal framework for
judging injunctions affecting expression. Contrary to the Madsen
majority's intimation, that framework should not come in the form of
another bright line rule, that of content discrimination principles. To
be sure, those principles arguably have the substance lacking in the
Court's prior restraint cases. But the differences between injunctions
and legislation render their application incoherent in the context of
injunctive relief, making them as meaningless in their own way as the
prior restraint label. Adequate assessment of injunctive reliefs impact on expression requires the Court to depart from its traditional
rules and make a "context-specific evaluation of the advantages and
disadvantages" of injunctive relief.327 Departure from the Court's
current doctrine, however, need not mean departure from its general
free speech principles. Rather, the Court should assess the legitimacy
of individual, speech-affecting injunctions in the context of its jurisprudence regarding government purposes. Adoption of such an approach most effectively implements First Amendment principles and
steers the Court away from dangerous use of "generalized proposi328
tions-couched in the obscure but colorful language of history.'

321 Fiss, supra note 10, at 6.
32 Il at 91.

